A nice and fair summary, Lee!
Few points:
A nice and fair summary, Lee!
Few points:
The Israeli air force (IDF/AF until 2004, ever since IASF), had one of its Kfirs shot down over Bhamdoun in Lebanon, by Syrian SA-8s, on 16 November 1983. Also, an F-4E was lost over the Beirut area on 16 October 1986 (pilot was recovered, RIO, Lt Ron Arad was captured by Hezbollah and disappeared ever since).
While there is some debate over the exact reason for the second loss, this means the F-16I shot down on the morning of 10 February is not ‘the first Israeli jet lost in combat since 1982’: rather something like, ‘the first since 1982 the public recalls’.
While the IDF Spokesperson cited 12 targets attacked on the morning of 10 February, the actual number was clearly larger. 12 seems to be the figure of ‘target areas’ hit during the 1st and 2nd out of three waves of air strikes launched by the IASF: gauging by all the available reports, the number of ‘aiming points’ (and thus targets) was definitely some 4–6 times higher.
The UAV: Assad regime has no own production of UAVs. The IRGC has production of multiple types. The IRGC is operating UAVs over Syria since 2012, and UCAVs since the last year. One of UAVs the IRGC (i.e. the IRGC-controlled defence sector in Iran) is manufacturing is Saeqeh UCAV, which seems to be roughly based on the US-designed RQ-170, one of which is well-known to have landed inside Iran, about a dozen of years ago. A comparison of what can be seen on pieces of wreckage of the UCAV shot down on the morning of 10 February, and photos of Saeqeh released by the IRGC, clearly shows that — no matter from where was it launched — the UCAV in question was a Saeqeh.
Other types of IRGC-manufactured UAVs and UCAVs — primarily Shaheed-129, but also late marks of the Mohajeer series — have been observed in operations over Eastern Ghouta just a day before, while supporting air strikes on local civic authorities.
The ‘Syrian narrative’ must not mention the UCAV in question. Reason is simple: ‘Syrians’ — i.e. the Assad regime — have nothing to say in the case of IRGC’s operations in Syria. Assad regime is bankrupt already since late 2011, and the IRGC is sponsoring its survival ever since. It should also be no secret that the IRGC has launched a military intervention in Syria, ever since first videos of its troops assaulting Darayya appeared in the social media, back in July or August 2012 (on the contrary: if anything about this affair is ‘mysterious’ or ‘secret’, then why is Israel, and why is the entire West so insistently ignorant of that development, ever since? For example: it’s only since the last year that the official Israel is complaining about the IRGC’s presence in Syria…)
Meanwhile, the situation is such that the Assad regime can barely cover expenses for about 40% of the ‘Syrian’ annual budget, and thus has less than 25,000 own troops, while all the other combatants nominally fighting ‘for’ it (reported figures are ranging between 80,000 and 160,000: documentation is available for at least 88,000) are paid for — and thus commanded — by the IRGC.
Furthermore, Assad regime has no incentive to show itself as instigator of this clash (i.e. the party that provoked it) — nor an incentive to clearly show everybody that it’s the IRGC that has the say in Syria, or that the IRGC can operate inside Syria at its own discretion.
All of this means that ‘Iran’ — i.e. the IRGC — was the centrepiece of this clash.
Regarding why should IRGC operate its UAV-unit from T-4? T-4 is not only the most important air base in all of Syria, but also in the centre of the country. It’s also far away enough from Israel to be reasonably safe. Means: it’s the best suitable place to position the command post for UAVs.
How should the F-16 survive a ‘SAM hit’ over Syria and then remain airborne for long enough to crash ‘only’ once it was over Israel? Aircraft like F-15I and F-16I are equipped with towed decoys and have built-in survivability enabling them just that. Gauging by the ‘reasonably intact’ wreckage of the F-16I that crashed in northern Israel on the morning of 10 February (no major part of the chassis or fuselage is missing), it’s easy to conclude that the SAM didn’t score a direct hit (which would certainly down the aircraft ‘on the spot’) but ‘proximity fused’ instead. I.e. the SAM went off nearby causing damage, but the aircraft remained airborne and crashed while the crew was attempting an emergency landing at Ramat David AB.
Re. ‘Syria has long been treated as a weak state torn by its civil war, and Israel was glad to exploit this situation. The fact that Syria — after a long destructive war, no less — was confident enough to engage with Israel sends a clear message against more Israeli intervention’. What is left of Syria under Assad’s control is comparable to the backyard of the Presidential Palace in NW Damascus. The rest is controlled by the IRGC (this controls not only all of Aleppo, but also most of Homs and southern Damascus, just for example), Hezbollah (all of Syria along the borders to Lebanon), different local warlords (Homs and Hama provinces), the Druze (south-eastern Syria), Russians (Hmemmem and Tartous), etc. The fact Assad’s air defences have fired about 24 SAMs in response to Israeli air strikes means not they are ‘confident enough’, but that for once the Assadist SAM-operators have detected enough targets to fire as many SAMs.
Finally, you write:
‘Last week, a Russian plane was shot down by anti-Assad Syrian militias for the first time in the war, probably using anti-aircraft missiles supplied to them by the US. Russia clearly knew that Syria was intending to attack an Israeli fighter, and may have even given the Syrians the intelligence or weapons to shoot down the pilot.’
Sorry, I’ll strongly disagree here:
There is no indication the USA have supplied any kind of MANPADs to any of Syrian insurgent groups. On the contrary, and as it should be well known since years, US ‘advisors’ have collected all the MANPADs from various Syrian insurgent groups already back in 2013.
On the contrary, there is a strong indication that the Syrian insurgents fighting on behalf of Turkey against the PKK/PYD/YPG-conglomerate in the Afrin enclave have captured at least one, probably more, 9K38 Strela (SA-18) MANPADS from the latter. The PKK/PYD/YPG-conglomerate is known to be operating such MANPADS at least since May 2017, when it used one of these to shot down a Turkish AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter.
Therefore, it’s perfectly reasonable to conclude that either
a) Syrian insurgents fighting on behalf of Turkey against the PKK/PYD/YPG-conglomerate have forwarded captured 9K38 Strela/SA-18 MANPADS to their ‘friends’ (groups like Jaysh an-Nasr or Jaysh al-Izza) in Idlib, or
b) Turkey used the capture of 9K38s from the PKK/PYD/YPG-conglomerate in the Afrin enclave as a cover-up for delivery of MANPADs to groups like Jaysh an-Nasr and/or Jaysh al-Izza in Idlib.
Gauging by the fact that so far only one deployment of such MANPADs in recent times is known (the one that resulted in the shot-down of the Russian Su-25, on 3 February 2018) conclusion is on hand that the ‘version a’ is more likely.
Gauging by photographs of different SAMs that came down inside Israel, Lebanon and Jordan on the morning of 10 February, the weapons operated by Assadists are the same they bought, or the Iranians bought for them already years ago — i.e. at least by 2011. SAMs in question were such like S-125 Pechora-2/SA-3 Goa, S-200VM/SA-5 Gammon, 2K12 Kvadrat/SA-6 Gainful, and Pantsyr S1/SA-22 Greyhound.
Curiously, there are no photos of wreckage of Buk M1E/SA-17 Grizzly SAMS, at least five systems of which are known to be operated by Assadists — often with Russian support.
I.e. there are no photos indicating deployment of anything that would, say, have been delivered by Moscow to Assad recently. This is little surprising, considering the financial status of the Assad regime: the Russians are ready to deliver plenty of things, but only if the customer can pay.
Foremost: it’s already since years that the mass of IRGC’s operations inside Syria is run autonomously from anybody else, though in cooperation with specific units — so also the air defence — nominally still loyal to the Assad regime. That means, for example: the IRGC has no reason to let the Russians know it’s going to send an UAV over Israel in order to provoke a ‘retaliation strike’ by Israel, in order to drag IASF’s combat aircraft into a SAM-trap (which is what appears to be the most likely scenario to me).