A much more systematic effort (than before), and thus far easier-to-read, mostly up-to-date too…
Some problems still remain. For example, there’s a major issue with the IRGC.
A much more systematic effort (than before), and thus far easier-to-read, mostly up-to-date too, result. Well done, Cody.
Some problems still remain. For example, there’s a major issue with the IRGC.
In Syria, the IRGC is represented through what is actually a separate command of this branch: the IRGC-QF (Qods Force, or Jerusalem Corps).
Officially, the IRGC-QF is a part of the IRGC and drawing hand-picked officers from the IRGC for service in Syria, but its status is meanwhile much higher: because it has its own representative to the Supreme Leader Khamenei (something that only the IRGC and the regular military have), it’s de-facto having the same power like the IRGC and the regular military. This might appear as a ‘minor detail’ to outsiders, but is of immense importance for inter-Iranian hierarchy.
In Syria, the IRGC-QF has its own HQ, with four geographically-organized areas of responsibility. Each of this gets units — or their elements — assigned as necessary. Some of these are staffed by Iranian nationals (i.e. officers drawn from various ‘regular’ IRGC- and Basiji-units), and units officially run by the IRGC (i.e. IRGC-QF), but largely consisting of foreign nationals (Liwa Zainobioun, Liwa Fatimioun etc.), where only officers are Iranian nationals. Because the latter type of units are biggest IRGC-operated units in Syria, and while perfectly in line of the IRGC’s ‘transnational’ ideology, this is making the IRGC-QF in Syria an ‘extra-territorial force’.
Thus, putting the ‘IRGC’ on its own on that table, and then the IRGC-QF ‘somewhere down the chain of command’ — ‘in between’ Saberine and various other ‘unclear’ forces — is, sorry, simply wrong.
Similarly, considering all the Iraqi Shi’a jihadists for ‘the same’, as if they would be one, monolithic block (or group), is wrong. They are not. Most drastic example: Sadrist ‘Peace Companies’ are present in Aleppo area and operating under IRGC-QF’s command in Syria, but in Iraq, and politically, this organization actually stands in opposition to the IRGC, and is under no condition to be considered as a part of it.
On the contrary, Harakat Hezbollah is Iraqi Hezbollah and thus a part of the IRGC-QF, while Harakat an-Nujba is a ‘closely allied’ group, although still not the same like Hezbollah. And, to make things more complex I guess, both of them are not the same with all the other Shi’a jihadists from Iraq — whether by ideology, or by their political political and financial associations.
So, that IRGC-related ‘tree’ should go like this:
IRGC → IRGC-QF → and then at least six different other branches pointing at following groups of units:
IRGC-QF’s ‘own’ units (i.e. those staffed exclusively by Iranians; usually there are two such brigades in Syria)
Hezbollah/Iraq
Hezbollah/Lebanon
Hezbollah/Syria
IRGC-allied Shi’a jihadists from Iraq (Harakat an-Nujba, for example)
other Iraqi Shi’a jihadists
On the other hand, units like that 65th Airborne Brigade, while correctly cited as part of the regular Iranian Army, are not present in Syria any more already since May 2016. The IRGC didn’t like the idea right from the start (see ‘rivalry’) and as soon as the 65th suffered its first mishap (it run into an insurgent ambush and lost some 20 KIA), it was sent back home.