Ukraine contracted for 300% more medium-range-strike drones in the first four months of 2026 than they did during all of 2025.

Ukraine’s fleet of 21 F-16s will be equipped with IRIS-T missiles. When used with a ground system, the missiles have a 95% hit rate. The biggest issue is that there aren’t enough of the missiles. The manufacturer started a new production line in January that will eventually produce 2000 missiles a year… in a few years…

Propeller-driven Shaheds fly at 185-200 kph, and jet-powered Shaheds cruise at 370 kph. Russia is now using the Banderol cruise missile that has a cruising speed of 520-560 kph with a 500 km range and a 150 kg warhead. Many of its components are foreign-made.

Then there is the UAV-290, a 3.5 meter long Ukrainian jet-powered drone with a 650 km range, an 800 kph speed and a 100 kg warhead. It was presented at the Eurosatory exhibition but there are no reports on whether it is operational, tested in combat or in serial production.

When Russia was denied Starlink services it crippled their medium-range-strike capabilities and slowed their communications. Russia tried to jam the Starlink downlink frequencies in 2024 in Kharkiv but that EW system was detected and destroyed by Ukraine. In 2026, a new system, the Volna Kupol Garant, is once again trying to jam Starlink, this time attacking the uplink frequencies from the terminals to the satellites. Built in Simferopol, they can potentially block connectivity for 20 square kilometers. They use a lot of power, which makes it easy to detect their signal, and deployment is easy to recognize visually. Two of the systems have been destroyed.

Ukraine’s Brave1 Dataroom was created in January for testing and training new AI models using real-world data from the front line. This would accelerate the development of autonomous systems. Enabled Intelligence is a US company that the NGA awarded a seven-year, $708 million contract to label data for its Maven AI program. It now has 500,000 hours of labeled Ukrainian conflict drone footage, with categories of weather conditions, terrain types and unpredictable scenarios. The video data is ready for sale to approved users working in the US, Ukraine and nations in the NATO alliance.

Ukraine launched the TrophyLab project. All the captured Russian missile, drone or vehicle, and every technical report on Russian equipment is now catalogued and available to Ukraine’s global partners on a secure platform. Partners can also request physical equipment for testing. Countermeasures can be developed on a shortened development cycle to stop any future Russian threat.

A 34-minute video describing a mystery and revealing a threat to GPS navigation and communication, and a solution that some nations are already implementing.

The Oreshnik is an intermediate-range ballistic missile that was first used against Dnipro in November 2024. Four missiles were built in 2025. One hit Lviv in January 2026. Another hit garages in Bila Tserkva in May. A third was launched on that same night and vanished over occupied territory. On 12 June, Ukraine’s Air Force warned of an imminent strike from what is probably the last Oreshnik missile. The recovered components are a Frankenstein mixture of components from multiple legacy missile systems.

Russian documents reveal that they used an obsolete gyroscope based on 1970’s technology because designing a modern navigation system for just four missiles would be extremely expensive and would not meet the deadline set by Putin. Extensive testing to expose hidden manufacturing flaws and be recalibrated would take too long so it was bypassed. The inaccuracy of the navigation system means the Oreshnik can miss its target by tens of kilometers.

Putin said that the missile was being mass produced, but after the inaccurate Bila Tserkva attack he changed the narrative and claimed that it was just a live fire exercise to observe results because it was still in development. In fact, there is likely just one missile left and when the Russians launch it, not even they will know where the submunitions will land.

Russia

The Palkino oil pumping station in Leningrad oblast was attacked.

The Poltavskaya fuel distribution hub burned after an attack.

The Gukovo oil depot in Rostov oblast was attacked. A 6 June attack on the Ust-Labinsk oil depot destroyed or damaged 13 out of 14 tanks. Some of the National Oil Reserve’s 50+ storage tanks were destroyed.

The shadow tanker FINA A was hit near Novorossyisk.

Drone shelters are being deployed in St. Petersburg.

The AZOT chemical plant in Novomoskovsk was hit.

Russia imported small amounts of gasoline from Belarus and Kazakhstan in the past to address regional shortages and now they are buying small amounts from Asia.

Vehicles and other targets were hunted in Bryansk.

A Russian Mi-8 helicopter was shot down by a Russian jet.

A Tu-22M3 bomber crashed in Siberia. Two other bombers crashed in that region in 2024 and 2025. Since 2022, 24 of the bombers have been damaged or destroyed. That would leave 41 bombers, of which ten may be operational. Russia stopped producing the strategic bomber in 1993 and there is no replacement planned for it.

Russia is building barracks that would allow 115,000 troops near Finland and Norway.

From several views, a truck in Belgorod was attacked, killing the driver. The 8th Corps hits a drone training center in L’govsky in Kursk oblast. A train pulling fuel cars was attacked in Bryansk, 60 km from the border.

The Black Spark resistance damaged a gas distribution station in Tambov and it wasn’t repaired for a week. They also burned another locomotive. Atesh sabotaged a substation in Taganrog that disrupted production of drone components at the Atlant-Aero plant.

Last summer there were long lines for gasoline due to distribution problems. This year, the fuel distribution problem will be worse. If Ukraine maintains their campaign of attacks on refineries, storage depots and pumping stations, the distribution problem may become a permanent part of Russian life for the remainder of the war. Fuel is already being stolen.

Diesel prices have doubled in the last two months and there is a waitlist of 45 days to receive it. The fuel shortage will make it harder for farmers to survive as a business, and it threatens the harvest of crops in both volume and quality.

Russia loses over a thousand soldiers a day, 70% of which are killed. 40% of Russia’s oil export infrastructure is neutralized.

Imperialism comes in many forms.

Ukraine

A Shahed is downed by an interceptor. One Ukrainian drone barely misses a Shahed but another takes it down. It is very hard to intercept Shaheds so Ukraine is deploying AI-driven drones. That said, one pilot flying remotely destroyed 22 Gerberas in a single day.

An Su-24 and both crewmembers were lost in western Ukraine shortly after takeoff.

Ukrainian pilots would much rather engage a jet-powered drone than a piston-engine Shahed because the jet-power Shaheds have a stronger thermal signature for air-to-air missiles, they don’t maneuver as much, and the pilots don’t have to slow their planes down as much.

1% of weapons fail to explode. That increases as the quality of production decreases.

Russia is continuing to attack components of Ukraine’s electrical grid, which is an effective strategy.

In 2024, Ukraine launched a few dozen drones per month. By October 2025, Ukraine was launching 100-150 drones into Russia every day. At that time, a manufacturer hoped to scale production up to 200 long-ranged drones a day. Last March, Ukraine sent more drones into Russia than Russia sent into Ukraine for the first time. And now, Ukraine is sending an average of 200-300 drones into Russia every night.

During attack missions, smaller decoy drones without explosives are launched first to occupy and confuse Russian air defenses. The military intelligence personnel plan the routes the drones take later that night. They know how the Russians move their air defense and electronic warfare assets. Every night they use a different flight route without repeating them. The routes and operations from different years are compared, and by now they know which corridors work best.

A Ukrainian commander named “Vector” said, “They are now our most important card in this war.” Vector said Ukraine can reach any location up to the Urals, and with a bit of luck, perhaps even beyond.

Land mines are in two dimensional space and can be identified by drones due to the temperature differential between the mines and the ground. Naval mines have a third dimension of varying depths, plus the mines shift with each storm and sometimes break free of their moorings. Mines in the Baltic Sea still exist from WW1 and WW2. More than 6,000 mines were laid off the Romanian coast alone during WW2. Russian mines in the Black Sea from this war will exist for generations even though Ukraine is clearing them now and has 5 NATO-qualified mine clearers in Britain waiting to enter the Black Sea after the war is over. For now, ships ask permission to enter Ukrainian water and the Ukrainian navy will give the guarantees of which routes are free of mines.

All of Ukraine’s iron ore and 90% of its agricultural exports are shipped from the Odesa hub of Odesa, Chornomorsk and Pivdennyi. With the loss of Mariupol, Berdyansk, and the Crimean ports and damage to Mykoaiv and Ovia, the amount of cargo the Odesa hub handles exceeds its design characteristics. Russian attacks on the infrastructure of the ports have significantly reduced Ukrainian exports and Ukraine’s largest farming union says the damages have reached a critical point, threatening the food security of Ukraine and the world.

Diplomacy

Lukashenko has fully supported Russia’s invasion by letting Russian forces invade across their border, sending supplies to Russia, letting Russian drones operate in Belarus while being supported by communication equipment in Belarus. “Against our united efforts, Ukraine has no chance. In case of a war, it will last 3-4 days. Ukraine has no one to fight us. The Ukrainians would be crazy if they collided with Russia,” he said on 5 February, 2022.

Belarus also lets radio transmitters that help Russian Shaheds operate on its border with Ukraine.

In May, when there was speculation about Belarus entering the war, Ukraine said they had a list of 500 critical targets in Belarus and they knew where Lukashenko was. That, plus the obvious reversals of Russian on the battlefield, seems to have caused a change of heart for Putin’s puppet.

He still lies about Ukraine, saying their long-ranged drones attack civilians, historical and cultural monuments, but last week he acknowledged that Ukraine would defeat Belarus if the entered the war, saying, “Belarus is very vulnerable militarily, because Belarus is exposed to the Ukrainian military like we are in the open palm of their hand. We fully understand that our key life-support facilities – industrial and logistical –would come under attack.”

He apologized for the harsh words, saying he might have over done it here and there, but Zelensky started the argument and he was just responding to it.

“I once traveled to Ukraine. Even my roots – my ancestors’ – are buried somewhere between Chernihiv and Kyiv. And are we supposed to throw all that aside, forget it, and start a war? No,” insisted the dictator.

Zelensky replied, “What’s the point of saying he [Belarus strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko] doesn’t want to be in the war? Let him remove this equipment, let him switch it off. I think a week will be enough for him to do that. If he doesn’t do it, ⁠we’ll do it.“

Lukashenko is apologizing. Orban was voted out. And Fico is talking with Zelensky to discuss energy cooperation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU. Two years ago, Fico said Ukraine was not an independent and sovereign country and supported Orban blocking a €50 billion EU aid package to Ukraine.

Macron says Trump changed his views on Ukraine because Ukraine defied predictions, Europe started taking responsibility, and Putin never kept a single commitment. Also, the G7 consensus is that Ukraine has the advantage. And then Trump speaks of his own delusions.

But it’s Trump, and there are reports that for the first time he approves of letting American missiles be manufactured on Ukrainian soil. Rubio did promise to send that last $400 million of aid Congress approved before Trump took office, so we’ll see.

NATO has periodically warned Russia of devastating air attacks if it uses a nuclear weapon, the last time during a nuclear weapons drill last May. The commander of the German air force said if NATO was attacked in any way, Kaliningrad, the Kola Peninsula, the St. Petersburg area, and the Black Sea would be targeted with air targets.

The UN Arbitral Tribunal ruled that Ukraine still has rights in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch bridge was illegally built.

Oil tankers have been sanctioned for years. The UK seized its first oil tanker two weeks ago, and last week it became the first nation to sanction Liquid Natural Gas tankers linked to Russia’s LNG 2 project in the Arctic. Over 20 other ships, three banks, and a technology acquisition firm that works for the GRU were also sanctioned. Britain also provided Ukraine $280 million for energy security and enriched uranium.

At the Ramstein meeting, the UK pledged another $1 billion in the form of 150,000 drones, 350 air defense missiles, radar systems and other equipment. NATO agreed that Ukraine’s three most urgent needs are air defense systems, drones, and long-range ammunition. Germany will provide a “three-digit” number of air-to-air missiles from its stockpile, it recently delivered another IRIS-T air defense system and will fast-track the delivery of missiles, and it will jointly produce Termit ground drones, a modular system with a 300 kg payload that can be used for supplies, medical evacuation or weapons. Germany, the Netherlands, Latvia, Norway, Lithuania, Denmark, Luxembourg, Croatia, Sweden, and Iceland pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), which allows Ukraine to buy weapons, such as the Patriot missile. The total aid package from Ramstein exceeded $4 billion.

Trump said that the US has nothing to do with the war, adding, “It has no impact on us, other than we sell weapons. We’re thousands of miles away.” Considering his active involvement in consistently supporting Russia objectives, this is probably the best outcome for Ukraine. He did bring up the possibility of reinstating the sanctions he lifted on Russia, but he says a lot of things so expectations need to be managed.

An exiled Russian artist that was critical of Putin was shot and killed in Poland. Two men from Belarus were detained.

(…to be concluded in the Part 4…)

Kherson

Back on 2 May, four Russian soldiers surrendered to a drone with a loudspeaker near the Antonivskyi bridge and were ferried to the Ukrainian side of the Dnipro river. One of them was the great-grandson of Leonid Brezhnev.

Unknown Location

A drone obstacle course.

A Yak-52 and a rifle can still bring down a Shahed.

Occupied Territories

The last of Russia’s three ferries that were capable of carrying rail traffic was knocked out on 6 April. Russia wanted to avoid sending explosive or flammable cargo on the Kerch bridge, so when the land bridge along the Azov coast could no longer transport enough supplies to Crimea, it was predictable that Russia would try to use ferries that could transport heavy trucks. It was also predictable that Ukraine would render them inoperable. At least three ferries transporting cargo were attacked at Port Kavkaz on the Russian side of the Kerch Strait. An oil depot at Port Kavkaz was also set on fire. Across the strait, 4-5 of the seven oil tanks in the port of Kerch were also burning. Ferry service has now been suspended.

At least one of the ferries was sold by Greece to Russia and started operating on the Black Sea in June 2025. As of a year ago, Greek shipowners also made US$4 billion selling aging tankers that ended up in Russia’s shadow fleet. Greece says they’re doing everything they can to stop such sales.

As part of Ukraine’s operations in the Kerch Strait, air defense systems and radars were attacked. An S-300/400 site was attacked 50 km west of Kerch. Zelensky said four radars at the S-400 site and two Pantsirs were hit. Oil depots and trucks were also attacked.

Hundreds of cars waited for the Kerch bridge to reopen during the attacks.

Magyar says that Crimea is no longer a staging ground for aerial attacks against Ukraine.

Russia is deploying mobile gun teams along the highways and using them to escort convoys of trucks. Some of the gun teams were redeployed from railroad protection. Isolated trucks and rail cars are still being attacked. There is a report that some convoys are being successfully attacked anyway.

Small mines that can destroy wheels have been dropped by drones but there has been no reports on how effective they are.

One minute of attacks on the oil terminal at Kerch, two radars, three gas compressor stations and vehicles. Five minutes of attacks on Russian air defense systems, radars, workshops, trucks, communication equipment and other logistics. The Glibivka underground gas storage facility was attacked in western Crimea, plus a locomotive, P-18 radar, radio repeater, two ZU-23-2 air defense cannon, fuel tankers, and a command post. Three minutes of four gas compressor stations, the Henichesk bridge, a tugboat, and a lot of vehicles. A thermal power plant near Simferopol was attacked. A Nebo radar in Kherson was destroyed. A fuel truck was destroyed 180 km from the front lines in Crimea. Over five minutes of Osa anti-aircraft system, radars, warehouses, Rubicon headquarters, and other Russian units, drone workshops, drone pilot training center.

A fuel truck dodged a Ukrainian drone. The drone’s second pass was not recorded. This truck swerved so the drone hit the trailer in a glancing blow instead of the cab.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet headquarters is leaving Sevastopol and moving to Novorossiysk because it’s difficult to defend and supply them. Morale is low. Russia is constructing defenses against amphibious landings. “For the Russians, hell is beginning — one that’s very hard to deal with,” Fedorov said. “Logistics are being cut off. Crimea is being isolated.”

Partisans destroyed a locomotive in Sevastopol (sorry: can’t post a link, the substack is complaining ‘it’s too long’).

Crimea relies on tourism and Russian tourists are canceling 80% of their reservations. Hotels have 30% occupancy compared to 65-70%, which is normal in June. The cancellations will increase to near 100% soon.

Tochnyi created an interactive map of reported mid-strike attacks over the last year.

A report that fuel was brought over the Kerch bridge while escorted by mobile fire teams. This conflicts with other reports that flammable and explosive materials were still forbidden on the Kerch bridge. A Russian blogger insists more fuel is coming. In any case, fuel sales to the public is now forbidden.

Moscow

The Moscow refinery was attacked by drones. It supplies 40% of Moscow’s fuel and 70% of the gasoline used in the Moscow region. Nearly 33% of Russia’s refining capacity is damaged. Combined with the attacks on nearby pipeline pumping stations, it will increase the distribution issues of fuel in the Moscow region. One of the largest Wildberries warehouses (similar to Amazon) and an apartment building were hit by Ukrainian drones, both in Elekrostal, a suburb of Moscow. A Pantsir tower was built one kilometer north of the refinery and the refinery is protected by at least five Pantsyr systems. One CDU-5 distillation that provided 53% of the refinery’s production was damaged. Production was to resume in a couple of days after this attack at half capacity.

Then the Moscow refinery was attacked a second time and 100% of the refinery’s production capacity was damaged. Multiple fires were seen. One drone hits a target, the second drone hits the anti-drone netting and explodes but the warhead explodes on the ground, and soon after an anti-aircraft missile streaks past. Turret-tossing in tanks was not uncommon but roof tossing in oil tanks is new. Missiles missing before the roof was launched.

A Ukrainian observer did a good job compiling ten videos with Russian air defenses in action and adding short descriptions. He also noted that a lot of the damage to civilian structures were a result of Russian missiles or Ukrainian drones that were shot down. And he acknowledges that most Ukrainian drones were shot down but is confused as to why so many drones were missed, sometimes by two missiles. The reason is because it is moderately difficult for Russian air defenses to detect and engage large drones, such as Ukraine long-ranged drones. It is even harder for Russians to kill smaller mid-strike drones and nearly impossible for these classic air defenses to engage FPV drones. It was the mid-strike and FPV drones that killed so many of the Russian air defense components near the front lines and in Crimea.

A pair of drones and a different view of the flying roof. The constant Russian claim that all drone damage is caused after it is shot down is only occasionally true. More drones are shot down. A miss. MANPAD systems augmented the small arms fire. Ukraine’s hybrid Bars drone/missile was used alongside the Lyutyi, FP-1, Sichen and Morok drones. At 300 kph, Morok drones are pretty fast for having a piston engine. Various drones flying over Moscow.

Helicopters were used to fight the fires. Pantsirs were placed on towers and buildings to make it easier for the radars to acquire a target, but these systems can be attacked wherever they are. Some residents were more upset than others. One resident provided accurate commentary. Citizens have questions. An employee at the refinery discusses with her mother whether she should go to work. And black rain came to Moscow. The Sadovod market burned when a drone was shot down and a thread discusses how the Russians feel about it.

A Ukrainian drone failed to clear an apartment. Maybe the new construction wasn’t in the maps. The crane definitely wasn’t on the map. In the land of Mordor.

On 27 October 2025, Russia said they shot down 34 Ukrainian drones on their way to Moscow, 193 drones throughout Russia, 47 of which were shot down in Bryansk.

On 18 June 2026, Russia said they shot down 992 drones in the last 24 hours. The Russian providing commentary said he lost count but at least 15 drones hit the Moscow refinery and the attacks kept coming. It was the third attack on the refinery in 30 days.

On day 3, the Russian cranes act as barrage balloons. Russia said they intercepted 37 drones in attacks that lasted from 12:10 pm to 2:12 pm.

Initial damage assessments are a complete shut down for a week to a month.

An air defense analyst’s observations on the Moscow attack:
-Ukrainian drones were flying at an altitude of 30-100 meters. Even with city buildings, the drones should have been visible for dozens of miles (1.6 km = mile). Russian air defense units were not ready. Many fired after the drones passed. The reasons could be: Poor training (highly likely), poor command and control, or no early warning.

-The lack of early warning could be the result of so many radars that have been destroyed.

-It is hard to assess command and control, but there appears to be a lack of planning and coordination. Several teams were located on the low ground near roads. It is possible that they were using the roads to quickly move around and compensate for an inadequate number of air defense systems, but locations on higher elevations would have provided better early warning if there was a shortage of radars.

-The air defense teams could be poorly trained or they could be operating substandard equipment, or both. There were multiple instances of failure that should not happen with well-trained personnel operating functional equipment.

The success of the attack wasn’t just planning, preparations and overwhelming numbers on Ukraine’s part, it was also because Russian air defenses have fundamental problems.

A drone developer says Russian deficiencies is not their technology, it is their personnel and organization.

(…to be continued…)

No idea about you, but I do consider myself ‘lucky’—if only because I don’t have to drive to work every morning and back home in the evening. Especially not during this heat wave. Arguably, 37°C in the afternoons demands a different organisation of daily life: short sleep at night, working early in the morning, a break around noon through the afternoon, then working again in the evening…

Generally, I’m an enthusiast—who would have guessed, given all the sarcasm and irony dripping around this blog?—but I’m also a bit of a fatalist. Thus, I can’t avoid the sad conclusion that this is how our summers are going to look for the rest of our lives: from June, well into August... sometimes even September. I’ve decided to patiently wait for the heat wave to pass... in some 3-4 weeks or more.

Who is not waiting, however, is that cabinet of horrors named Israel. IQ47 has reached an agreement with Iran? Great: let’s bomb Lebanon a bit more. There’s hardly anything that provokes that orange idiot more. That, promptly, resulted in another stupid rant—making sure the Iranian delegation walked out of the meeting in Switzerland. Because—whether the Israelis and US-Americans admit it or not—it’s crystal clear by now that Iran actually won the war imposed upon it by Israel, the USA, and the UAE.

Why did it win? Because it developed not only the doctrine, but also a very precise political- and military strategy for how to counter the Israel-USA-UAE axis. So much so that the IRGC regime made it clear to everybody (except the horniest Zionists around, of course—Jewish, Christian, or otherwise) that it can survive whatever they throw at it, while continuing to inflict massive punishment. This has resulted in a situation where even the greatest racist idiots in the USA have had to accept reality: they can’t defeat it.

Unsurprisingly, and in reaction to IQ47’s offence, Tehran has already announced it is re-closing the Strait of Hormuz. Of course, CENTCOM rushed to explain this isn’t true, and whatever else... but well: CENTCOM’s statements can meanwhile be taken as seriously as those by IQ47 and the Grand Vizier of the Zion…

Ah yes... Don’t worry, my dear Zionist fans (yes, there are quite a few of such): Israel doesn’t need to care. It’s well-supplied and -supported, can continue the genocide in the Gaza Strip, and torching Palestinian villages and ethnically cleansing their population (including Christians, BTW) in the West Bank in peace. Because it’s so sacred, and holy, and God’s hand-picked, and infallible, and a victim—and because ‘the West’ owes it support no matter what... because Israel is so much more important than Ukraine, for example.

(Should there be any doubts, ask Ukrainian Zionists.)

...and so, against that background, ‘that unpleasant affair’ in Ukraine remains a ‘sideshow’. That, my dear and esteemed 1.95 readers, is going to remain ‘the topic’ for this summer. So much so that I sincerely—even if with lots of sadness—find it boring trying to discuss anything related. But, well: don’t blame me. If the majority of people who can still do so remain horny to elect corrupt hypocrites, religious fanatics, and racists to power... while the ‘established’ political parties remain so mired in their own corruption quagmire they can’t think of a way out: again, sorry, but I’m not to blame. Especially not after analysing, explaining, and warning for years...

Over to Don.

Overview

Wars are a battle of wills. Revenge is one of the strongest emotions, and it is often evoked by both Russia and Ukraine in various forms as a means of rallying the nation’s will. Nevermind that Russia attacked Ukraine. If Ukraine conducts a successful operation, Russia swears it will avenge itself upon Ukraine.

When Russia struck the historic Pecheersk Lavra, Zelensky said that Ukraine would respond. When oil from the refinery started raining down on Moscow, naturally, Russia threatened revenge on a mass scale. If Russia could do more, they would already have done it. All they can do is more of the same.

Ukraine has timed the drone attack on St. Petersburg to have the maximum propaganda effect on all the foreign visitors at the economic conference and to embarrass the Russian host. They timed the Moscow attack as a response to the attack on a thousand-year-old symbol of Ukrainian culture. Propaganda aside, both of these attacks reduced Russia’s capacity to wage war by some small amount. Attacking Lenin’s tomb would have been a waste of a warhead. Ukraine must continue to destroy Russian capabilities as efficiently as possible in order to save Ukrainian lives.

Russia’s air defenses still take its toll on Ukrainian drones and yet Russian refineries, factories, trucks, warehouses and command posts, and, yes, air defenses, are being destroyed at a rate that continues to increase. Europe is funding more drones, Ukraine is using more drones, and Russia has not demonstrated an ability to reverse this trend. The only limiting factor is how many drones Ukraine can build and how many teams they have to launch and fly them.

There is still value in destroying the Kerch bridge but with the rail line in Crimea cut, and with the widespread attacks throughout Crimea, the need is less urgent. Russian air defenses around the bridge continue to deteriorate. This may prepare the way for weapons with large warheads. The Kerch bridge is a symbol of Russian imperialism and its destruction represents a blow to the Russian national will. When and if that happens is in Ukraine’s hands.

In the meantime, Ukraine continues to erode Russia’s capacity to fight, not just with their attacks inside Russia, but also in the temporarily occupied territories. The attacks are increasing in number and scope and half the Russian army is in danger, not just in Crimea, but in Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, as well. At a time when Russian resources are being reduced on the front lines, Russia has to deploy more of them to their rear areas, only they will never have enough resources to protect everything.

For their part, Russia is continuing to attack components of Ukraine’s electrical grid, such as substations, and it’s possible that they will start their own campaign against Ukrainian bridges.

The fighting is difficult on the front lines, and it will remain that way for a while. But the Russian army is slowly, increasingly fragile. Russia spent 9.5% of its budget (2% of its GDP) on recruiting in the first quarter of 2026 and recruiting was still down by 20% compared to 2025. Russia is suffering more casualties than they can replace.

All of Russia’s problems are having an impact on the front lines and these problems will continue.

Lyman

Russians are spotted between Zelena Dolyna and Shandryholove. But there are still very few videos published by Ukraine.

While Ukraine is attacking the Russian bulge, Russia is attacking Lyman directly and the 59th Assault Brigade engages them. A report that a number of Russian troops entered Lyman from the south, so they will have to be cleared out again. Claims that Ukrainian air defense systems were bombed.

Sloviansk

There is heavy fighting at Kryva Luka. Both sides are fighting inside Kalenyky, and Rai-Oleksandrivka is the primary objective to close the pocket on 32 sq km of land. Through it all, Russia is suffering heavy casualties.

A lone soldier from the 81st Brigade engages three Russians in Zakitne, killing two of them while the third retreats. Although this was successful, this is the kind of encounter that the Ukrainian infantry want to avoid, not just because they could be shot in the firefight, but because they could be seen by Russian drones. The best case scenario would have had Ukrainian drones eliminate the three Russians while the Ukrainian infantryman remains concealed.

The 81st Brigade stopped a much larger assault consisting of 28 motorcycles, one tank, three infantry fighting vehicles, seven motor vehicles and more than 50 troops that attacked in waves. One column moved from Platonivka to Zakitne and another column advanced from Siversk to Kryva Luka. Drones, mortars and artillery eliminated the vehicles and FPVs mopped up the infantry.

Russia attacks a small church in Zakitne several times. The front is really thin, and Ukraine says Russian infiltrators made it to Piskunikva.

Kostiantynivka

To understand the scale of the battle, two weeks ago it was estimated that 100 to 250 Russians were in the city. Last week, Ukraine’s 19th Corps said there were 11,000 Russian soldiers in the sector and about 123-125 Russians inside the city. That said, Russia is pushing more soldiers through Ivanopillia, which is one more source of pressure. They continue to infiltrate from the east and the southwest of the city and more Russians have been spotted in the center of the city and in larger numbers. On top of that, Russia was able to infiltrate past Stepanivka once again.

Pokrovsk

The first medium-ranged Behemoth was used by the 7th Corps on an ammo depot, a battalion command post and a troop concentration at Kurakhove.

In classic combat, infantry and other weapon systems are placed in a linear defense to detect and engage any enemy forces moving across their front. In the era of drone warfare, it is dangerous to expose personnel on the front lines. Ukrainian infantry is still there, but their primary mission is to observe and call in drones or indirect fire. Only as a last resort do they engage with the enemy directly. Ukraine’s 3rd Corps has a goal to replace 30% of their infantry with drones. Many times they use a ground drone to man a position for days, weeks and months. The 7th Corps shows that aerial drones can also man the front lines. One aerial drone covered an open field, lying in ambush for any Russian foolish enough to cross terrain that provides no cover or concealment.

Zelenyi Hai

Ukraine has expanded the gray zone to the Mokri Yali river from Piddubne to Filiia. If Ukraine can keep their troops in the gray zone supplied and Russia cannot, then the gray zone will become Ukrainian controlled territory.

A drone from the 42nd Brigade observes the Shahed launch positions at the Donetsk Airport.

Huliaipole

Russia is using a lot of people to make minimal gains in this sector.

Zaporizhzhia

20 motorcycles and 7 quad bikes and their associated riders were defeated by Ukrainian drones at Mala Tokmachka. The unit that’s been defending the village, the 118th Mechanized Brigade, has its own song, which is played in the video. The line, “…and 4712 keeps the line…” refers to A4712, the brigade’s Military Unit Number.

Russia hit Ukrainian positions in Preobrazhenka. Russia attacked a warehouse that stored FPV drones.

12 KABs launched by 4-5 Su-34s targeted bridges in Zaporizhzhia City. They missed, probably because of jamming, but they had to land somewhere. One bridge was damaged by the blast wave and temporarily closed. Four civilians were killed and six were injured.

(…to be continued in the afternoon…)

The Crimean peninsula lies between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. At the narrowest point, 90 km of the peninsula is separated from mainland Europe by the Syvash lake and lagoons. Only nine kilometers of solid land connects the peninsula and the continent, and Armiansk was built at that location. A hundred years ago, there wouldn’t be any bridges to bomb here, but construction on the Kakhovka dam was completed in 1956, and in that year work began on the North Crimean Canal to carry water from the Kakhovka reservoir to the Crimean peninsula.

All the bridges entering Crimea from the east cross the Syvash Lake and lagoons. All the bridges in the west cross the canal.

Because of the canal, there are a couple dozen bridges that connect northern Crimea to southern Crimea. 15 more bridges cross the canal in Kherson, as well. With the Armiansk bridges knocked out and the pontoon bridges being attacked before or soon after they are erected, Russian trucks have to cross the canal further west in Kherson before they can head south into Crimea.

Currently, all the roads near the Azov Sea are blocked, and the highway near the Black Sea is blocked. Two of the bridges on secondary roads are blocked but 13 other bridges are unblocked. Crimea is not cut off from vehicular traffic but Russian trucks have to make a detour of several hours to enter Ukraine. This detour keeps the logistical traffic within range of Ukraine’s mid-strike drones for a longer period of time, and the closer the trucks are to the front lines, the easier it will be to detect and attack them.

The concrete bridges will be difficult to repair while Ukrainian drones can attack them. Pontoon bridges are easily damaged and easily repaired, so they will have to be constantly attacked. Each delay costs time. Trucks are vulnerable to attack while they are waiting until a pontoon bridge can be reestablished .

More of the canal bridges can be destroyed. Pontoon bridges can be set up at each of the crossings so these sites have to be constantly monitored and attacked when a new bridge is erected. Russia has a lot of pontoon bridges, but not an unlimited supply.

Any delays in logistical runs are good. The prevention of logistical deliveries is better. The destruction of the logistical cargo is best.

Currently, trains cannot enter Crimea from the north and trucks can only enter from the north if they use a canal bridge north of Armiansk. It is likely that Russia will spend more air defense resources to protect and open these crossings but this will also make those defenders targets, as well. Two BMPs were supposed to shoot down drones and, at a minimum, they each took at least one FP-2 out of the fight before they were destroyed. Infantry that was deployed to shoot down drones observe a strike a few hundred meters away. A Russian blogger says they are not able to stop the Ukrainian drone attacks and Crimea will be without electricity soon.

Russia’s other option is to start using the Kerch bridge once again to transport fuel, ammo and equipment. When this happens, it will indicate that Russia can no longer sustain their forces in Crimea through the occupied territories. The Kerch bridge is 250 km away from the front lines and it is likely that Ukraine already has plans to destroy it.

Ukraine is trying to cut off Russia’s supply lines to Crimea. It started with an attack on the Kerch bridge in October 2022. A truck bomb destroyed a span of the vehicle bridge and set a fuel train on the railroad bridge on fire. That fire weakened the railroad bridge. In July 2023, naval drones damaged both the road and rail sections of the Kerch bridge. In June 2025, an underwater drone attacked a section of the vehicular bridge but it reopened soon after the attack.

After the 2023 attack, Russia reduced the dangerous loads on the Kerch rail bridge. There used to be 42-46 trains crossing the bridge with weapons and ammo each day. In the first three months of 2024 only one train with 55 fuel cars crossed the Kerch bridge. After that, Russia stopped sending flammable and explosive cargo across the bridge to prevent structural damage if the cargo was attacked.

Ukraine then attacked the Chonhar vehicular bridges in the northeast of Crimea with Storm Shadow missiles in 2023, but they had a limited number of the missiles, the missiles were expensive, and Russia built a pontoon bridge as an alternative crossing. The attacks could not be sustained and Russia eventually repaired the concrete bridges.

Russia started relying on its ships to carry the fuel but Ukraine had been attacking Russia’s naval transports for years. When the railway ferries were damaged in June 2024, Russia was forced to temporarily transport dangerous cargo on the Kerch bridge for a while again. In March and April 2026, Ukraine attacked the last railway ferry working the Kerch Strait and put it out of operation. There are still smaller car ferries but they cannot carry the same loads and they operate at their peril.

Russia relied on the railroads in the occupied territories to transport supplies to Crimea, but in the spring of 2025, Ukrainian drones started attacking the trains that used them. Trucks carried fuel and other supplies on roads in the same region but now Ukrainian drones are attacking targets all the way to the Azov Sea. While this has reduced the number of trucks delivering supplies and slowed many of the other trucks that use secondary roads, it has not eliminated all the cargo from reaching Crimea. To reduce the flow of supplies to Crimea even more, Ukraine once again started attacking the bridges leading to that occupied territory.

There is an old highway bridge and a new highway bridge at Chonhar. Both have been damaged and are impassable. As with the 2023 attacks, Russia built a pontoon bridge as an alternate crossing but it was also destroyed. The Railroad bridge has been attacked multiple times. There are no reports of attacks on the dirt road causeway and bridge. That road is about 3 meters wide and the bridge may not be able to sustain heavy loads.

To the east of Chonhar is Henichesk, which is at the northern end of the Arabat Spit road. It’s a shorter route to Kerch but a much longer route to reach the rest of Crimea, and trucks can’t travel on that road as fast as on a highway. Henichesk is the only place where Syvash Lake connects to the ocean.

Halfway between Armiansk and Chonar is the Syvash Lake bridge and causeway. It is 2600 meters long and there is a small bridge at the northern end of the causeway. The road is narrow and the bridge may not be able to bear a lot of weight. Any vehicle using that bridge would have to travel 60 km on secondary roads before reaching a highway.

***

(…to be concluded in the Part 2…)

But first…

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For Putin to go the way of Hussein, Ceaușescu, Qaddafi, and so many others, there first needs to be serious political infighting between the power factions of the Kremlin. Loyalty is clearly in short supply. But Putin has built a system that keeps everyone under watch by having the various arms of his kleptocracy monitor/battle each other.

The FSB watches the military, the military watches the battlefield and controls the war machine, the GRU runs military intelligence and covert action, the oligarchs and state corporations control money networks, and the Presidential Administration manages domestic politics. Putin sits above them as arbiter. He allows overlap, competition, and suspicion because this keeps every faction dependent on him. The system is designed so that no single faction can safely move without wondering who is reporting on them.

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Until these branches of “government” start fighting each other on a much larger scale, Putin is probably safe from his own ruling elite. If the Russian people stage an effective demonstration of power, that could accelerate everything. But I have little faith in the Russian people to do anything except line up to die like cowards.

The possible scenarios for Putin losing power are:

1. Military coup.

A few generals may be enough to surround the Kremlin and remove Putin. But this is a tough order because the FSB and other security organs are constantly looking for exactly this kind of treason. The Russian military has guns, manpower, and battlefield legitimacy. But it is also penetrated, monitored, and politically distrusted.

2. Military and FSB joint coup.

This is the least likely scenario. It is exactly what Putin designed his system to prevent. He wants the military and FSB at each other’s throats, not plotting together against him. A joint move would require trust between institutions that have spent years watching, blaming, and undermining each other.

3. FSB coup.

This is the most likely coup scenario, but it would still be difficult. The FSB is the largest organ of Putin’s spying and influence machine. If the FSB could remove Putin quickly in a public display of force, it would have a plausible chance of holding power afterward. It has the surveillance networks, internal security structure, and coercive reach needed to monitor Russia for any attempted counter-coup. It could also move against true loyalists who might try to stop the transfer of power.

Right now, no coup scenario is likely. Anyone suggesting that Putin is already on the edge of removal is probably chasing views and clicks.

Will it become more likely in six months? Yes. But I still do not see signs of the level of infighting that would signal a real power struggle. There is also the possibility of a poisoning or “accident” involving Putin. But his paranoia is renowned. That outcome is also unlikely.

As the saying goes, dictators are powerful, until they are not. Which means all of these scenarios are possible. But at this point none are likely. The greatest accelerator of these scenarios is Ukrainian success inside Russia. The more the war comes home to Russia, and it suffers publicly, the more it publicly denies Ukraine success while Telegram and Western media show the success as undeniable, the weaker Putin becomes. So it is Russia’s own reflexive responses (to lie and deny) that could eventually destroy it. The more Putin goes on TV to tout battlefield gains that don’t exist, the more the FSB seeds lies, the more Kremlin state TV pushes the official story, the closer Putin comes to defeat.

I continue to travel to, often live in, and work in Ukraine, a connection that spans more than 15 years. I hold an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and have consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence related to the war in Ukraine. I am a co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, which operates in southern Ukraine. You can typically find me between Odesa, Ukraine, and Charleston, South Carolina.

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Researching Ukraine

I consult with journalists and intelligence professionals on drone warfare, AI, and OSINT, drawing on over 14 years of deep experience in Ukraine.

Diplomacy

Bulgaria’s new government won in a landslide in April and it won’t send anymore aid to Ukraine because when weapons are sent “its only result is the loss of human lives.” Bulgaria is one of the largest producers of Soviet-standard ammunition. Their shipments through third party countries were critical in the early months of the war. In 2023, Russia tried to assassinate the owner of the arms factory and a depot was sabotaged in June of that year. Most of Ukraine’s Soviet-era equipment was replaced by Western equipment last year. Bulgaria’s current government is critical of the EU’s support of Ukraine.

Armenia’s ruling party supports stronger ties to Europe and they won 49.8% of the vote last week. Two pro-Russian parties won 31%. An opposition leader and billionaire was under house arrest for incitement to seize power and financial crimes. Russia was accused of exercising pressure through public threats and trade measures. Azerbaijan wants Armenia to change its constitution to remove an implied claim to Nagorno-Karabakh but the government does not have a two-thirds majority needed to call a constitutional referendum and it is virtually impossible to negotiate such a sensitive issue with the opposition. Azerbaijan’s demand was a requirement of the peace deal and a prerequisite to opening the border and trade with Turkey.

After a Ukrainian drone was defeated by Russian electronic warfare it was redirected to Latvia where it was shot down by a French NATO fighter.

The moment of shoot-down was captured on a video, too:

The UK seized their first shadow tanker.

The U.K., Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey host US nuclear-capable aircraft. Discussions are underway for additional countries hosting the aircraft. Russia regularly makes nuclear threats but it is demanding that all US nuclear weapons be withdrawn from Europe, saying Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus don’t threaten the US.

There is a proposal to ban anyone who served in the Russian army since 2022 from entering the EU. The proposed sanctions package will also target 30 more shadow fleet tankers, 31 Russian and 20 foreign banks, crypto platforms and other financial institutions will be restricted. Russia’s fishing imports will be restricted or banned. Equipment used in drone operations will be restricted.

The Latvian government had been discussing how to implement a ban on all trade with Russia since it would disrupt their trade patterns and the industries that support the flow of goods. Then Russia doubled the tariff on all rail traffic to Finland, Estonia and Latvia. The Latvian rail and port workers may face layoffs because of the sudden decrease of goods without increased trade with Europe. Tariffs on grains from Kazakhstan will increase to $16-18 per ton, making them less competitive on the market. Russia is dependent on Lithuania for rail traffic to Kaliningrad and does not have a direct border with them.

Even though a significant amount of trade traveled through Russia, all three Baltic States are planning to dismantle their rail connections with their aggressive neighbor because of national security concerns. Over the next several years they will convert their rail lines from Russian to European gauges to improve trade with Europe and strengthen national defense capabilities.

Equipment

Ten months ago the US agreed to sell 3,350 ERAM missiles to Ukraine for $825 million ($250k each). The missiles have a reported range of 930 km and has a 45 kg warhead*. An F-16 can launch 12 of the missiles at the same time and Russia would have to jam eight different frequencies to block their GPS guidance. If GPS is blocked, it also uses autonomous visual-navigation. It is probable that Ukraine already has them since deliveries were expected to begin last October and debris associated with the missile has been recovered.

*By comparison, Storm Shadow/SCALP costs $2.5 million, has a 550 km range and a 450 kg warhead.

The co-owner of Fire Point said, “I can’t say how many Flamingos we produce a month, but there are enough of them in storage. Now, when we get an EU loan, they will fly in a flow.”

Russia has 2,088 tanks in storage. Of those, 851 can be restored to battlefield readiness. Oryx says 4,350 Russian tanks have been visually confirmed as destroyed. Ukraine says they destroyed over 12,000 tanks.

Ukraine established the goal of developing AI interceptor drones and it has now been combat tested in Kharkiv. After the AI drone is launched, the operator selects a Shahed drone and the interceptor drone locks on and engages. The operator can override at any time. Five interceptor drone manufacturers have contacted Brave1 (Ukraine’s version of DARPA) to integrate the technology with their products.

Russian ambush drones sit on a road and attack anything approaching it from the front. A lot of them have been disabled by Ukrainians approaching the ambush drones from the rear. This ambush drone had both a front and rear camera.

Russia’s ‘Courier’ UGV hadn’t been used much since they lost Starlink. Now it is being controlled with fiber optic cable with radio control back up capabilities and it is being used to deploy mines and up to ten smoke grenades and ten mines.

Ukraine is testing a UGV as a MICLIC demining system.

Ukrainian Army Reforms

Ukraine will increase pay minimums from $335 to $670. Infantry that spend a month on the zero line will receive a $6,700 bonus instead of $2,234, which is the highest pay rate for infantry in the world. Any soldier taking a Russian prisoner receives a $2200 bonus. Any Russian killed in close combat or small-arms engagements earns an additional $335. Commander’s pay will gradually rise from current levels, as well.

Infantry and assault personnel will have a fixed contract of 6-14 months. Drone operators, artillerymen and medics will be offered a 24 month contract. When a contract is completed a soldier can be temporarily discharged and there is at least a minimum six-month deferment before remobilization can occur. Each month spent carrying out combat tasks gains another 3 months of deferment. Each year in service since 2022 earns another 6 months deferment, and each year of service before 2022 earns another month off.

Some Ukrainian soldiers were in bad situations with disorganized units, bad commanders, or other situations that put their lives in danger unnecessarily. Many of them wanted to transfer to other units. When their requests were denied, they went AWOL. Soldiers can now transfer to another unit in the same corps through the administrative app within 30 days. They can do it once a year and after a transfer they have to wait six months to do it again. There is a limit of 50 transfers a month from a brigade/regiment, or 10 transfers a month from a separate battalion. The digitized data can also call attention to troubled units or highlight effective units. The transfer process will be tested in one corps before it is activated throughout the army.

Service members whose units do not fall within the areas of responsibility of the Armed Forces of Ukraine corps will not be eligible under this procedure. Assault regiments are not assigned to a corps.

AWOL soldiers will once again be given a limited window to return to the army. They can choose their unit and commander and the steps for reintegration are simplified.

Ukraine will make it easier for foreign fighters to join the infantry and assault forces, a role which most Ukrainians do not want. The goal is for 30-50% of the infantry and assault forces be foreign fighters. The digital system will provide the documentation of what they are owed, including pay and medical treatment.

There is also a new monitoring system for front line troops that confirms their location, which is useful for battlefield awareness, locating wounded soldiers and confirming that they qualify for pay bonuses.

Despite Zelensky’s promise to discontinue the practice of establishing ever additional new brigades, yes: there is a new brigade assessment system that uses 160 indicators to measure frontline performance systematically. The goal is to transfer the best practices developed in ‘successful brigades’ to ‘all units’ and reduce preventable mistakes.

Over the summer, mobilization reforms will be revealed.

Russia

The Novokuybyshevsk refinery in Samara was attacked. Using jet-powered drones, the Afipsky refinery was attacked for the third time this year. The Nizhnekamskneftekhim petrochemical plant and refinery were attacked 5-8 times. The Tamanneftegaz refinery was hit. The Tolyatti refinery was also set on fire.

The Grushovaya oil depot was attacked near Novorossiysk. 10 tanks were damaged or destroyed after the May 25th and June 8th attacks on the Frushovaya depot. It’s the largest depot in the Caucasus with at least 64 tanks that store 20% of the oil that will be exported. The was attacked by multiple drone despite being defended by small arms fire. Damage from the Poltavskaya oil depot back on June 5-6. The attack on the Rybinsk oil depot resulted in black rain.

A pipeline in Dagestan suffered three explosions that might have damaged a gas distribution station. A pumping station in Volgograd was severely damaged.

Because of distribution issues, fuel sales in Tatarstan, St. Petersburg and Moscow are now restricted. Sales have already been limited in Crimea, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. Distribution issues are caused when production from local refineries or pipelines bringing in fuel from other locations are damaged and unable to function.

The tanker West Horizon was attacked in the Black Sea and its engine and steering was damaged.

The head of Russia’s Main Missile and Artillery Directorate was killed near Moscow when his car blew up with the equivalent of 500 grams of TNT. A driver was killed in another car explosion near Moscow.

The Tolyattikauchuk plant produces 25% of Russia’s rubber and was hit. A substation powering the Alchevsk metallurgical plant was hit.

The VNIIR-Progress plant produces the Kometa antenna for Shahed drones, Iskander-M and Kalibr missiles, and the Russian glide bombs, as well as other electronic components. It is important enough to have been attacked in June, July and November 2025 and February 2026. It was hit in May with two drones and a Flamingo missile. That Flamingo hit outside in front of the main building and caused extensive damage inside.

It was attacked again last week with five Flamingo missiles, three of which were shot down. The remaining missiles caused a fire and extensive blast damage. Low-resolution satellite imagery shows that the main building is destroyed. The views from the ground also show extensive damage. Two views of a Flamingo in flight, and shortly after the second missile impacted. Even just one direct hit by a Flamingo is devastating.

Last year there was a 3-5 month wait for the Kometa antennas and some drones and bombs weren’t equipped with them. Now, decoy Gerbera drones were equipped with them, indicating a large surge in production. But the number of antennas being produced isn’t as important as an upgrade in capabilities would be.

Ukraine’s Lima electronic warfare team has been working to jam the Russian Kometa antennas in all their weapons. When the design of the antennas was changed and prevented the old Lima equipment from jamming or spoofing them, the Lima team changed their design and approach and was able to defeat the new antennas a few months later. Both sides were continuing to develop improved products. The attack on this building will delay Russian development by a significant amount of time.

A large ammo depot in Belgorod explodes. A Russian locomotive is hit 40 km inside Bryansk oblast, bringing the train to a halt. Hangers used to assemble Shahed drones were attacked at an airfield near Ryazan. The Arsenal plant in St. Petersburg was attacked.

Black Spark destroyed a pipeline section in Novgorod. Freedom of Russia destroyed a locomotive in Sverdlovsk Oblast. An interview with a member of the resistance movement.

Russia still has enough fuel for everyone but sometimes has difficulty in transporting the fuel to certain regions. After a meeting in the Leningrad region, the governor decided there were no issues with the availability of gasoline, which is why fuel tankers and cube trucks could no longer be allowed to refuel at gas stations.

A colonel who was a military commissar in the Rostov oblast fell out of his window.

Ukraine

Ukraine is running out of time to find $6.2 billion and implement its energy resilience plan for next winter. Russia destroyed 9 gigawatts of power last winter. Ukraine has a goal to build decentralized power and water supplies protected by fortifications. They are trying to find a way to use part of the €90 Russian loan to fund that effort. The city of Kyiv allocated $200 million from its own budget and the national government provided an additional $45 million for the effort.

A Ukrainian minister said, “The capital still does not have an approved comprehensive resilience plan. This work must be translated into a clear documentary framework – with realistic implementation schedules, designated responsible officials, signed decisions, and continuous monitoring of results.” Back on 20 April, Zelensky wrote, “Unfortunately, as of today, not all regions are working at the level required to protect people.”

Russia had been attacking major power generation facilities. Ukraine started to decentralize it power sources. Now Russia is striking individual components of Ukraine’s energy system, which is expensive and time consuming to replace.

Kyiv is attacked by over a dozen ballistic missiles and the Dormition Cathedral is burning.

Ukraine operates four Skynex systems that were delivered by November 2025. They are very effective point defense systems with a 4 km range and a €60 million price tag. 35 Shahed drones and two cruise missiles flew within range of one of those systems and were shot down. Twelve of the drones were shot down during one attack. Here is a video of six of the shootdowns in which 35 mm rounds explode in close proximity of the targets. The plan is to produce 400 a year by 2027.

A cargo ship was hit heading to Odesa to load metal was hit; the same happened to another vessel leaving with a load of wheat.

(…to be continued…)

Occupied Territories

We, ‘finally’, can see evidence of Russia sending drone interception teams to fight Ukraine’s medium-range strike drones. This Russian drone took down a Hornet on the R-280 highway that runs along the Azov Sea coast. While this Russian team is protecting their rear area, they are not defending the front lines. There is a lot of ground to protect and attack and the war of attrition continues. In addition to drone teams, EW units are being diverted from the front lines to operate in Russia’s rear areas. At a time when Russia is feeling the pressure of Ukrainian counterattacks, they are forced to pull units back to an even bigger threat.

Russia is also forming convoys with their trucks that are escorted by vehicles with machine guns, not unlike the Allies did in WW2 to protect against German submarines. The Hornet drone has a cruising speed of 100 kph, so it could take up to two hours to prepare, launch and fly to the Azov coast. This would make it difficult to detect a convoy, estimate its destination and meet it with a wolfpack, or in this case, a swarm of Hornets.

It is more likely that Hornets within range might be able to assemble to conduct a joint attack on the convoy and its mobile gun teams. Hornets have a sprint speed of 200 kph and a dive speed of 300 kph while using AI terminal guidance. Hornets have been launched from aerostats as high as 8 km and Ukraine knows from its experiences with Shaheds that drones above 2,000 meters cannot be hit by machine guns. While Shaheds are about 3 meters in length and 2.5 in width, Hornets are smaller with a 1.4 meter length and 2.2 meters in width.

The port of Mariupol was assaulted by multiple drones. Electrical substations, radar stations, repair facilities, the control tower, and fuel storage tanks were damaged or destroyed. The port had no power and was unable to operate. A cargo ship was also attacked.

An An-26 and Su-30 both crashed in Crimea without involvement of Ukraine. In March, Russia lost a Ka-52, Mi-8 and another Ka-52 helicopter, plus an Su-34 to either friendly fire or a crash.

The 1st Corps also destroyed a lot of Russian trucks. A fuel truck was destroyed 70 km from the front. Trucks in a parking lot, a railway bridge and pontoon bridges to replace vehicular bridges were attacked.

In two weeks, cargo traffic on the main highway by the Azov Sea fell by 71%. This is a reflection of trucks trying to avoid Ukrainian drones. First, civilian traffic was ordered to stay off the highway. Then civilian trucks were used to transport military cargo. Now military traffic is required to use secondary roads. This will increase the time it takes Russia to resupply its forces. Time will tell if it will reduce the destruction of Russian trucks.

A Tor and Buk air defense systems, a tugboat, three substations, a command post, a warehouse and a deployment area were hit. In another video, a Tor, Zu-23 and MANPADS air defense system, drone and troop deployment sites and command posts. Machine guns in Melitopol failed to protect a substation. A substation in Donetsk was hit. A fuel and lubricants train was hit at the Shchetovo rail station in Luhansk. The 3rd Brigade attacks Russian vehicles. Trucks at the Dzhankoy checkpoint after an attack.

The Simferopol power plant was attacked and large parts of Crimea were without power. A resident complains about the lack of gas, transportation, electricity and hot water. The Dzhankoy rail station was hit while a large number of Russian troops were present.

A day after the Chongar bridge was reopened, it was damaged by FP-1/FP-2 and Behemoth drones and one lane was closed, requiring traffic from both sides to alternate using the bridge. A rail and vehicular bridge in Armiansk and another vehicular bridge nearby were attacked and severely damaged. 50 trucks in a parking lot north of the Armiansk bridge were also attacked. A bridge near Henichesk was attacked and damaged. Russia has been deploying pontoon bridges as alternative crossings and these have been attacked, as well.

The multiple drones that attacked the Armiansk bridges and the waiting trucks also attacked the Crimean Titan chemical plant with at least 17 drones carrying 100 kg warheads.

Russian tourism in Crimea fell by 31% compared to this time last year. Most people travel there by cars or buses. The fuel shortage, bridge shortage and occasional power shortage, those numbers are guaranteed to fall throughout the summer.

After the Russian military started using civilian trucks to transport equipment and ammo, three Russian logistics companies refused to carry cargo to Crimea. They are also finding it harder to find military and civilian drivers.

(…to be continued…)

Another walk to Kostiantynivka happened on May 18th. The last one in March started in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka but this one starts in Druzhkivka itself, at a point 11.8 km to the city. Russian drones have been attacking vehicles and civilians in Druzhkivka for months already. But it still has water, gas and electricity so while many have evacuated, others stay in their homes.

Two soldiers are rotating out of Kostiantynivka. The rotated in on 14 February and are now leaving after 93 days, still with quilted underwear on. Rotations used to be a month, said one infantryman, but it is what it is. Drones and mortars repeatedly forced them into cover and concealment on their way out, adding hours to the trip.

A month ago, Russians would enter the city in pairs or as singletons. In addition to drones and mortars, bombs and chemical gas would be used. Three more soldiers were rotating out. When asked how it was in the city, one of them laughed and said it was a f*ing disaster and they wouldn’t recommend it to anyone.

Another soldier was returning from the city pulling a hand cart. Having delivered equipment he was bringing other gear back. He had a net gun, a last resort weapon, but hasn’t had to use it yet since they were able to shoot the drone down with their rifles. When asked why he didn’t drive a car he replied that the reporters will soon see why. He used to be able to drive in the winter, but they were used less often over time. A couple days ago a fiber optic drone almost hit a car near where they were talking and cars have been banned ever since. Plus, you can see and hear drones better on foot. While they were speaking, a truck drove by at high speed under the nets.

Two civilians with a dog were riding bikes and stopped to talk. One left Druzhkivka three times and returned because she ran out of money and nobody cared. She thought lives were more precious than land so the war should be ended right away. She felt sorry for the people.

Another soldier said he might be shooting at one drone when a second drone appears and he’d have to shoot at both of them at the same time. He’d see anywhere from 3-15 drones a day. On the side of their vehicle was a bird cage with a drone in it. He was asked what he fed it and he said 5.45 mm and 7.62 mm mostly. He said that 2 male and 2 female civilians were evacuated that day, and just as an ambulance arrived a Russian drone tried to attack them, so he shot the drone down.

When they arrived at Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka the atmosphere had changed. Almost no civilians were around and every building was damaged. One soldier was walking on the road by himself while his teammates stayed in the woods to avoid cameras. He told them to be careful because there are a lot of mines ahead and that it was a complete sh*tshow in the city. If one drone sees you then 5-7 more appear. The ambush drones mostly appear in the morning after flying in at night. When asked why he had both a shotgun and an assault rifle. The shotgun was more effective at close range and he said if one got close he’d shoot it down. After four years on the front, he said he wasn’t bragging. He said the world would be saved by music, love, respect and humanity.

Then his five teammates walked out of the woods. One of them was asked how it was and he said, great, they were waiting for the reporters to visit and help. They encouraged the reporters to film their battalion commander who had been talking with them and walked on.

The reporters had two devices with multiple frequencies that not only warned them about drones in the area, they could also pick up the video feed of the drone so they could see what the drone pilot could see, and they saw it was headed in their direction so they concealed themselves under some trees. The closer they got to the city, the more they had to wait under trees because of drones, not sure which were friendly and which were enemy.

They finally reached their destination, which was an outpost of a mobile fire team from the 24th Brigade that constantly hunted drones. When one came by, two of them stood in the street firing and slowly rotating 180 degrees as it flew by them. They fired some more when it came back but it flew away and they missed it. It was moving fast and at 80 meters altitude it was high and at 200 meters distance it would have been luck if they hit it. They reloaded their magazines with loose rounds from an ammo box and waited for the next drone.

A few days earlier a drone had been hit once but was still flying and targeted a soldier on a bicycle. He wasn’t wearing body armor but was still moving when they reached him and bandaged a deep wound in his back and his head injury. He was evacuated in a vehicle but died in the hospital.

The flyover drones are easy. When the drones target them, it becomes dangerous. One said at that point fear takes over but they keep firing until the end. The end is when the drone is five meters away.

It’s easy to hear fast drones, but when they fly slow they are very quiet.

They decided to move closer to the city and stopped 3 km outside of it. There were no vehicles at that point and they constantly had to hide from drones. There were mushroom clouds in front and behind them from glide bombs. They were able to decide to go home. For infantry rotating in, this point would have been the beginning of their battle and they’d have to survive in the ruins for months before they could walk back out again, if they lived that long.

On their way out, rain was expected in 30 minutes and several vehicles were speeding to the city. The Russians like to attack in bad weather because the Ukrainian drones are less likely to fly. The Ukrainians move in with their vehicles in bad weather for logistic runs and to evacuate the wounded because the Russian drones are less likely to fly.

Everyone’s schedule revolves around drones.

Pokrovsk

Ukraine discovered a vehicle warehouse 8 km from the front and sent multiple drones into the abandoned coal mine to destroy the contents. The drones had plenty of time to attack the stationary vehicles and hit the protected vehicles in their weak spots.

Russian infantry being chased by drones. Russian drones attacking Vodyanske and Dobropillya.

The 7th Corps and 4th Ranger Regiment identified and destroyed six Russian drone launch sites in Pokrovsk. Because the city is on a higher elevation and has tall buildings it is a good spot to launch and maintain drone communications.

A Russian 2500 meters beyond the front lines doesn’t conceal himself and ends up buried.

Russia conducts drone attacks in Dobropillia.

Novopavlivka

The Perun drone unit of the 42nd Brigade found a loaded Russian BM-21 rocket launcher hiding in a building.

Zelenyi Hai

The 95th Air Assault Brigade destroys a BTR. Russian drones destroy an M109 155 mm gun.

Ukraine is still slowly pushing forward, turning Russian-controlled territory into a gray zone. Ukraine’s deepest penetration is 3 km at Ternove.

Russian drones hit a house in Piddubne, fighting positions and a drone.

Huliaipole

Ukrainian drones attacking Russians in Huliaipilske. The Russians are slowly pushing forward in Huliaipole.

Zaporizhzhia

A Ukrainian position east of Kamianske was attacked.

Kherson

Ukrainian drone are hitting logistics 60 km from the front, making resupply difficult. A truck was hit at a gas station 50 km south of the Dnieper. A Russian gun was destroyed 12 km from Kherson.

Ukraine has identified ten Russian drone operators by name that hunted civilians.

Unknown Location

Somewhere in Donetsk, a first person view of two Russians surviving a hit on their ‘loaf’.

(…to be continued…)

Slightly later than usually, and without a longer intro this time: sadly, I’m still so busy with my usual work (‘I’ll be back to explain this, ASAP’… and you’ll see: I’ve got a few ‘good excuses’, too). Therefore, straight over to Don.

Overview

Ultimately, this war is about territory. Russia lowered its goals from seizing all of Ukraine to securing land it currently occupies, plus the rest of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine’s goal is to recover all of its territory that Russia seized going back to 2014. In order to accomplish these goals, both sides need to reduce their opponent’s capabilities and will to fight.

Since seizing territory is a major political goal for Russia, they have to advance or change their goals once again. They still need to advance 40-50 km to secure all of Donetsk. They do not have the capability to do so right now and there are several trends that indicate their capabilities will be further reduced over time. They will continue to expend personnel if they believe they can still advance.

Eventually, Ukraine will need to take their territory back, but that should not be their immediate priority. First, they need to stop the Russian advances to stop the destruction that always accompanies the Russian army. Kostiantynivka is already destroyed and Druzhkivka behind it is now being more heavily bombarded. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk are in the early stages of destruction because the Russians are within fifteen kilometers. Russia is making equally slow progress around Huliaipole. Everywhere else, even in Pokrovsk, Russia is not advancing.

With the Russian advances mostly stopped, Ukraine has to create the conditions for successful attacks of their own. The first step is to reduce Russia’s capability to fight.

Ukraine is doing that with the long-ranged attacks that are increasing in numbers and intensity. Energy export infrastructure is being damaged to reduce Russia’s income from sales. Refineries are being hit hard to reduce income from domestic sales and reduce fuel supplies for both military and civilian use. Pipelines and oil storage tanks are being attacked to make it harder to move, export and refine oil and store the refined products. Factories are being attacked to reduce the production of equipment. The damage to the VNIIR-Progress plant is a severe blow to Russia’s ability to protect their drones, missiles and bombs from Ukrainian efforts to jam and spoof them.

The mid-range strike missions are destroying equipment in the trucks and warehouses, as well as staging areas for personnel, communications and senior Russian leadership. The FPV drones are destroying both equipment and personnel over fifty kilometers away.

The next step is to isolate a portion of the Russian army. Ukraine has a smaller army than Russia, but if they can isolate a sector, eliminate some of the enemy personnel in that sector and prevent replacements from taking their place, they can then overwhelm and eliminate the remaining Russian defenders in a way that drones and artillery cannot.

It is possible for an interdiction operation to be so effective that enemy forces withdraw without any ground combat. Kinburn Spit is narrow and has little vegetation or terrain that can conceal vehicles from detection and attacks from drones. There is a plausible report that the few Russian forces that were on the Spit could no longer receive food, water or ammo, so they were forced to withdraw.

From Donetsk to Zaporizhzhia to Kherson, Russian supplies and personnel being moved to the front lines are being attacked. Most of the supplies are getting through, but enough is being destroyed to see a noticeable decrease in Russian capabilities. At the moment, they can defend their positions and conduct limited attacks, but if the interdiction on their logistics is maintained at this level Russian capabilities will be reduced over time. This will create more opportunities for Ukraine to take offensive action.

Crimea is isolated by terrain. Read: the sea. Russia has limited naval combat power and transport capabilities and these ships are threatened by aerial and naval drones. Russian supplies cannot enter Crimea by land without crossing a bridge, so these have been targeted and the most critical ones have been damaged beyond use, and any pontoon bridges that are erected are attacked. Any trucks that are detected are attacked. Russian forces in Crimea are consuming more supplies than they are receiving, and their combat power is becoming weaker over time.

Reclaiming occupied land is a primary objective for Ukraine but eliminating Russian strategic and tactical capabilities is the immediate priority. In addition to reducing Russia’s numerical superiority, Ukraine is multiplying its smaller combat power with technology and the quick flow of information. Ukraine is moving quickly with innovation and air attacks and being patient on the ground. It is a winning formula.

Sumy

A train depot in Konotop, Sumy oblast, is attacked 75 km from the border. A Shahed drone was shot down and fell on a passenger train in Sumy as a soldier ran to provide aid. The train station in Shostka was attacked, killing one employee and wounding another.

A TOS-1A hits Ukrainian positions 3 km from the border.

Kharkiv

The 16th Corps destroyed a TOS-1A. Oryx has visual confirmation that 36 others have been destroyed or captured.

Russian drones attack vehicles, trains, an oil depot, a substation, a mobile machine gun team and buildings in and around Kharkiv.

Kupiansk

Russian forces continue to attack east of Kupiansk but have not secured any territory in a few weeks. Their forces continue to suffer losses while advancing and 10 km behind the front lines. These Russians were attacked on the northern edge of Kupiansk.

A Ukrainian on an ATV was lucky.

Lyman

The only video evidence of a Ukrainian attack are Russian videos, but there are reports of geolocations in satellite imagery. A Russian blogger believes Ukraine advanced further than can be visually confirmed, but he also thinks Russia had more territory than it actually did. Russian posts also say Ukraine captured some villages and are contesting others. Andrew Perpetua is only marking what he could confirm visually from Russian videos. In addition to Ukrainian attacks in the Nove area, there are multiple reports of Ukrainian attacks near Novoselivka.

There have been reports of Ukrainian drone superiority in the sector, a requirement for an attacker to minimize its casualties. More equipment was destroyed after a drone blew the door off of a building and all the vehicles inside were revealed.

Russia was still able to destroy a bridge over the Nitrius river with 50 attacks by FPV drones.

Sloviansk

The 81st Airborne eliminates some of the Russian soldiers and equipment that were advancing towards Mykolaivka. The Russians bombed Mykolaivka and Ukraine conducted an airstrike near Markove. Russians found a vehicle depot in Kramatorsk.

Kostiantynivka

Ukraine’s 20th “K2” drone regiment is trying to prevent Russian logistics and personnel from reaching the front lines. They also eliminated a Russian officer that was part of Putin’s propaganda. The Ivano Frank group hit targets 40-70 km away on either side of Donetsk.

Russians were observed gathering in a building so Ukraine dropped two bombs on it. There were plenty of Russian targets for the 28th Brigade. There were a lot of Russians in the city and they all wanted to be seen. Russian penetration into the city is increasing in size and depth.

Russia is no longer bombarding southwestern Kostiantynivka and has shifted those attacks further north.

(…to be continued…)

The problem is that every proposal for a pause eventually runs into the same obstacle: enforcement. If you think destroying a buried nuclear enrichment program is difficult, try destroying digital data that can exist (almost) anywhere.

It is easy to imagine American and European firms agreeing to restrictions. It is much harder to imagine Russia or China accepting meaningful constraints on technologies they increasingly view as central to military power. Even harder is imagining a verification regime capable of detecting violations inside opaque state systems.

That shows us the real problem: not all participants would bear the costs equally.

Ukraine’s military adaptation cycle is deeply connected to Western technology firms, commercial software, cloud infrastructure, and western defense startups. Much of its wartime innovation has come from rapidly integrating civilian technologies, including AI, into military applications and then refining them through battlespace feedback. Those relationships are visible and documented. Easy to regulate.

Russia’s system is different. It is more centralized, much less transparent, and therefore less exposed to Western scrutiny. If a future AI governance regime imposed real friction on Western firms while relying on voluntary compliance from authoritarian states, the burden would likely fall disproportionately on the side already playing by the rules.

That is the strategic concern I found under-explored from Anthropic’s argument.

Kate Bondar recently made a related observation while discussing drones and AI in the war. Russia is investing heavily in data collection, annotation, and the infrastructure needed to support increasingly autonomous systems. Ukraine is doing the same, but through a more decentralized ecosystem and with Western help. The side that learns fastest gains an advantage. Any policy that slows one learning cycle while assuming the other will voluntarily slow as well deserves skepticism.

There is another issue that receives far less attention than Anthropic’s runaway AI scenarios.

Anthropic worries about recursive self-improvement. I worry about recursive error.

The defense community is already moving toward greater use of synthetic data, AI-generated outputs, automated labeling, and machine-assisted training pipelines. Some of this is necessary. Real-world military data is expensive, sensitive, and often difficult to obtain. Synthetic environments help fill gaps.

But every abstraction introduces distortion (error).

Every model is a simplification of reality. Every synthetic dataset reflects assumptions. Every automated labeling process carries hidden errors. When those outputs become inputs for the next generation of systems, mistakes can compound in ways that are difficult to detect.

(Remember my piece on this back in February? Models = Error, Every model, without any exceptions .)

Shumailov and his colleagues described one version of this problem as model collapse. Systems trained recursively on machine-generated data gradually lose information about the underlying distribution they were supposed to represent.

The more immediate danger is not necessarily that an AI system becomes uncontrollable, rather that it becomes confidently, even defiantly wrong.

Defense procurement already creates incentives that push in this direction. Organizations naturally optimize around whatever metrics are easiest to measure. Goodhart’s Law is not suspended because the technology is sophisticated.

A system can perform exceptionally well in testing and still fail under operational conditions.

Ukraine provides a useful reminder of what operational conditions actually look like.

During Russia’s massive combined aerial attack on 1-2 June 2026, Ukrainian defenders tracked 729 airborne threats, including hundreds of drones alongside cruise and ballistic missiles. The challenge was not simply identifying objects in the sky. It was understanding relationships between them. Which tracks represented genuine threats? Which were decoys? Which vectors mattered most? Which interceptors should be allocated where? How would the picture change over the next several minutes?

And it is exactly the kind of environment where accumulated modeling errors become dangerous.

Imagine a small error embedded in a model designed to track incoming attacks and recommend how to allocate scarce defensive resources. Perhaps it slightly misclassifies a particular flight profile, underestimates a threat axis, or overweights a certain sensor input. On its own, the mistake may be difficult to notice.

Now imagine that the model’s outputs are used to generate synthetic training data, assist with labeling, or inform the next generation of models recursively. The original error is no longer just a flaw. It becomes part of the training standard. With each retraining cycle the mistake is reinforced rather than corrected. Over time, the error becomes embedded in the model lineage itself—the assumed baseline against which future systems learn.

Everything may appear to improve. Benchmark scores may rise. Performance in controlled environments may look impressive. Yet the underlying flaw remains, waiting for the moment when reality diverges from the assumptions baked into the training process.

That possibility concerns me more than most discussions of recursive self-improvement to the point of AI abandoning guardrails. In fact, if AI does autonomously abandon guardrails it will be because of compounding error that the models and inference engines see as “fact”.

The lesson from Ukraine over the past several years has been remarkably consistent: reality wins (data). Systems survive contact with the battlespace only if they are continuously updated against real-world conditions. Data collected under combat conditions matters more than the elegant assumptions.

This is why I find former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s broader arguments about the “AI Race” interesting. Democracies need to remain competitive in frontier technologies not because they are inherently wiser, but because they possess mechanisms for accountability, correction, and adaptation. Those advantages disappear if democratic systems voluntarily constrain themselves while assuming authoritarian competitors will do the same.

A pause that cannot be verified is not a pause. It is a chance for adversaries to close the gap.

If policymakers are serious about AI governance, verification has to come first. So does an honest assessment of who bears the costs of restraint (US/Ukraine) and who benefits from evasion (Russia/China).

There is no good answer to the problem that Anthropic has described. The AI-cat is out of the bag. But there is a good way to make things worse. Rely on China and Russia to tell the truth about any slowdown or pauses related to AI.

Citations Page

1. Anthropic Institute, “When AI Builds Itself,” 2026.

2. Benjamin Cook, “Recursive Training in AI for Defense and Security,” Researching Ukraine, 2026.

3. Kate Bondar, “Drones and AI at War,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2026.

4. I. Shumailov et al., “AI Models Collapse When Trained on Recursively Generated Data,” Nature, 2024.

5. Ukrainska Pravda, “Large-scale Russian attack: Ukrainian air defences down 642 aerial assets, hits by 30 ballistic missiles recorded,” 2 June 2026.

6. Brave1, official defense-tech cluster description.

7. Hoover Institution, Condoleezza Rice remarks on democracies winning the emerging technology race, 2025.

Russia launched 656 drones and 73 missiles over Monday night and Tuesday morning, killing 22 and wounding dozens others.

An F-16 shoots down a Kh-101 missile.

The automotive workshop of the Mayak plant in Kyiv was attacked. A food production facility was attacked and four killed.

Ukrainian helicopters shot down 379 Shahed drones in March, over 500 in April, and 440 in May.

Actionable Intelligence

The National Reconnaissance Office of the US used to launch satellites and process and distribute the imagery and other intelligence that the satellites provided to the warfighters. During the 1991 Iraq war, the imagery from the satellites would reach US combat commands several days after it was downloaded. The coalition forces moved so quickly that the intelligence was out of date by the time the intelligence was provided. The NRO still launches and operates the intelligence satellites but the US created another organization, what became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, to combine all the intelligence from multiple sources and provide it to US forces in a timely manner.

Ukraine underwent a similar transformation. Satellite intelligence used to be transmitted to Kyiv to undergo centralized reviews that could delay the flow of information by hours or days. Information is perishable. If it is not acted on quickly enough the information becomes worthless.

An army needs the right blend of centralized and de-centralized functions. Ukraine decided to empower the front line units and remove the centralized vetting process. Former intelligence officials warn that this increases the risk of soldiers acting on incorrect information. In fact, the same information is provided to everyone with access to it and the responsibility for vetting the information is now handled at a lower level. The front line units also have a greater knowledge of terrain and enemy behaviors in their sector.

Vantor is a US commercial satellite company that has 10 satellites that cover 7 million square kilometers daily. Its resolution capability of 5 meters is sufficient for targeting an object with 50 kg of explosives to make sure the target is destroyed.

Ukraine automated the information flow from Vantor with the help of the Dutch company Bravo1Alpha, US-based Persistent Systems, and the Ukrainian defense firm Burevii. The software allows anyone in the flow to compare current and past images to detect and track Russian movements. This method revealed that a former agricultural facility had fresh tire tracks leading to it. It was subsequently discovered that it was being used as an ammo depot and was then targeted and destroyed.

Ukraine can download commercial satellite imagery and send it to frontline units in 15 minutes. AI-assisted analysis and 3D modeling can reduce days- or weeks-long tasks to a few hours. Using imagery, signals and other intelligence that was combined, Ukraine was able to identify a Russian command center, attack it and observe the results. This information flow reduces that time to locate and hit a target by 90%.

Ukraine is now a leader in military information flow and Western military doctrine is being influenced. The US Special Operations Command added software to provide near real-time images to mobile devices. The US Army is still developing systems to give front line units access to information that is free from centralized review.

Diplomacy

All the Democrats, six Republicans and one independent representative in the House voted to advance a Ukrainian aid bill 218-204. This forces Speaker Johnson to bring the bill to a vote. The bill would provide $1.3 billion in security and reconstruction aid and would loan Ukraine $8 billion. The bill passed with all Democrats and 18 Republicans voting 226-195. It would probably not get the 60 votes needed in the Senate unless Trump gives his approval to the nominally independent legislative branch. The Senate had a bill of Russian sanctions with 80 of the 100 senators co-sponsoring it, but the Republican leadership doesn’t want to hold a vote on it. The US provided Ukraine $195 billion in aid until Trump took office.

Congress approved military aid for Ukraine under Biden and $400 million remained unspent under Trump. Rubio said that it will be sent to Ukraine soon.

Biden agreed to send Tomahawk missiles to Germany. Trump is reversing that decision. The reason given is concern about escalation with Russia, an excuse that Biden often used in limiting the deployment of US weapons. In fact, Hegseth said it would take years to replace the missiles expended in the Iranian war and Germany’s Merz said he did not expect the US to station Tomahawks in Germany due to the limited availability of the missile. The US also plans to withdraw jets, drones and naval units from Europe, as well. The US general that is NATO’s top commander and the head of US forces in Europe said that Europe “can step up now and in the near term” and America will refocus equipment and forces elsewhere.

A Ukrainian naval drone drifted into the Romanian port of Constanta. Romanian authorities said it was scheduled to detonate and it did. A Russian Shahed decoy drone landed near Besesti, which is 100 km from Romania’s closest border with Ukraine.

The shadow fleet tanker Tagor and its Russian captain are in French custody.

The US is holding head-to-head drone competitions to issue $1.1 billion in contracts to buy 300,000 drones. In each round, the winners are awarded small contracts of a couple thousand drones and advance to the next round. The price of drones in each round decreases. One company was eliminated after it received zero points on the ability to manufacture thousands of drones, so they are going to build a factory and compete in next year’s competition. The army plans to spend $54.6 billion on drone warfare next year.

In the last three weeks, the US escorted 70 ships into and out of the Persian Gulf. That’s about three ships a day when well over a hundred ships a day travelled through the strait before the war. An empty oil tanker heading to Iran ignored several warnings over 24 hours so the US fired a Hellfire missile into its engine compartment to disable it.

Based on the recommendations issued by the International Olympic Committee in May, sports organizations are relaxing or removing the restrictions on Belarusian and Russian athletes. This includes Union Cycliste Internationale, the European Gymnastics Federation, and the International Fencing Federation. It seems that while invading and supporting an invasion of a European country is bad, if you invade for more than four years you are then accepted as a member in good standing with the world community even as the unjustified war and deliberate targeting of civilians continues. A moral response would be to boycott these organizations but self-interest always rules the day.

Equipment

A tanker from Ukraine’s 92nd Brigade said that the tank is not doomed. The US is working on an anti-drone turret with a radar and cannon. If successful, it would restore the tank to its original role. For now, bad weather is an ally of the tank. It’s used as a defensive weapon. Some units use it as artillery, but the 92nd rarely uses it in that role. In fair weather, they’re only used when the defenses are in trouble and the benefits outweigh the risks.

The Bullfrog is a US-built 180 kg weapon system using an AI-powered machine gun that detects, tracks and identifies drones. A human operator approves each engagement but the AI fires the weapon. It is designed to work on multiple systems as the US industrial standard shifts from closed proprietary systems to weapon systems with modular interoperable autonomy.

The largest factor in a successful drone attack is the skill of the pilot. It takes three months to train a pilot, on average. Different types of drones, such as interceptors, fiber-optic, reconnaissance or normal FPV drones, all require unique skills. The UK and US are moving towards using more unmanned systems but they have not focused on pilot training. Polish pilots will be trained by Ukraine. Engineers are also crucial for preparing a drone for on operation.

An FPV drone from Ukraine’s Phoenix border guard unit hit a target 103 km from the launch site, setting a record. It had high quality radio receivers and batteries prepared by the Phoenix engineering team, but the most important factor was the pilot’s skill.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces have 20,000 of Ukraine’s 900,000 military personnel, which is 2.2% of the army. The goal is to increase the size of the force to 45,000, or 5% of Ukraine’s personnel. If nations dedicated 2% of their forces to unmanned systems then Germany and the UK would have 3,600 personnel in the force, Poland would have 4,300 and the US would have 26,000 unmanned systems personnel.

Ukraine is planning to eventually replace piloted drones with AI. They now have drones with terminal guidance once a human has selected a target, and these drones are four times more likely to hit a target than drones piloted by humans. Even with AI, though, how drones are prepared and used play a huge part in how successful they are.

Ukraine successfully tested the Freyja missile for a second time, this time under guidance. Ukraine is developing it to intercept ballistic missiles at a cost of less than $1 million. The most complex part of the system will be the development of a ground radar network and targeting system. The company is talking with European companies to complete development of the missile by the end of 2027. Fire Point is valued at $2.5 billion and the UAE is buying a 30% stake for $760 million. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau is still investigating certain aspects of the company.

Russia has not been able to produce a successful heavy bomber drone so they salvage downed Ukrainian Vampire drones and 3D print replacement parts for them in repair workshops. This salvage effort has been conducted over a couple of years.

Russia’s finance ministry said that military spending is set to exceed the budget by $28 billion at its current pace and the deficit could reach $56 billion under certain circumstances. They foresee deficit spending of $56 billion in 2027 and 2028. They are asking the government to cut non-essential spending by 10%. The National Wealth Fund is shrinking fast, high inflation is creating a debt crisis among companies and consumers. Trump’s war in Iran increased the price of oil but Ukrainian strikes on exports neutralized that benefit.

Air defenses at St. Petersburg were removed in previous months. After oil terminals were attacked multiple times, there was a plan to create mobile gun teams to intercept drones in the region. As people, including a US delegation, gathered at an international economic forum in St. Petersburg, long-ranged rifle fire acted as air defense while storage tanks at the oil terminal were repeatedly struck. Here are multiple views of drones flying freely over the city.

The drones traveled all night to reach the region and attacked the Kronstadt naval base for the first time. The corvette Boikiy was attacked by two drones and set on fire in a dry dock. A satellite image captures six fire hoses battling the fire on the Boikiy.

The first US delegation to the St. Petersburg economic forum since 2017 is represented by a collection of people, including Russian passport holder Steven Segal.

Kremlin spokesman Peskov said the attacks in Ukraine “continues precisely so that there are no attacks similar to the attack on St. Petersburg.”

Three days later the 15th Naval Arsenal was attacked 20 km from St. Petersburg with flames showing on satellite imagery. The Research Institute of Physics, the Marine Thermal Engineering Institute that develops underwater weapons, and the Kronstadt docks were attacked again. The oil depot and terminal at Lomonosov was attacked and the local citizens had reactions as drones flew overhead. One tank at the terminal was destroyed and six were damaged. The damage and short term closure could cost Russia $50-100 million.

The Antipinsky refinery burned.

The Lazarevo pumping station was attacked 750 km east of Moscow and may be out of action for a while. It transports Siberian oil to central Russia. The Semikolodyansk oil depot and terminal was attacked in Crimea. The Balakhonikhinskaya Oil Pumping Station suffered two severely damaged buildings.

Ust-Labinsk stores fuel from refineries and redistributes it by road and rail when it isn’t burning.

A 375 ton patrol ship was hit about 10 km north of Kerch by an FP-2 drone. There were fatalities among the crew but the damage to the ship was not reported.

Another Russian air defense missile that hits an apartment, this time in Uzlova, Tula oblast. The A+A weapons and ammo factory in Tula burned after an explosion.

Three trucks and gas station equipment were destroyed by drones in Belgorod.

Throughout the year, Russians have been called into enlistment offices to update their personal data and often receive a mobilization order when they arrive. A Russian lawmaker says there is talk of a fall mobilization but unless Ukrainian drones are neutralized more conscripts will only result in more casualties.

Right now, Russian law forbids child labor under 14. A new proposal will allow children to work starting at 12 years of age.

The trains, rail lines, private stations, airfield and squadron used by Putin are documented. Other events involving the Khotilovo-2 airbase are discussed.

The SBU said that up to 41 aircraft were damaged to some degree in Operation Spiderweb a year ago. There might have been more but one of the trucks burned on the way to the launch site. The SBU prepared the operation over 18 months. The drone development team wasn’t told of the objective. A Russian couple of Ukrainian origin assembled 150 drones and eight mobile cabins inside Russia and the drones were hidden in the cabin roofs. Drone pilots from the front line trained for the mission but weren’t told of the objective until the day of the attack. 117 of the drones were able to launch. The pilots flew the drones through the local cellular networks and onboard camera feeds. Some of the planes that were hit weren’t operable, but attacks on Ukraine using Tu-95MS bombers declined by 20-30%. Tu-22M3 bombers are used only once every six months now.

Russian Truck Production and Losses

A Russian rifle regiment needs 500 trucks to supply its troops.

Because of tank losses, Russia emptied its storage facilities of tanks. Russia has between 40-50,000 trucks in storage in various states of repair. If there were 50k stored trucks, and they could theoretically be recovered, and the losses leveled off at 279 trucks a day (the May average), the stored trucks would be expended in 180 days. But there may only be 40k of them in storage and if losses average 400/day (less than the last days of May), the stored trucks will be expended in 100 days. However, there may be much fewer than 40,000 stored trucks that can be recovered. The analyst Jompy says that most of the stored trucks are junk due to lack of maintenance for decades.

In the Rostov oblast, one such truck storage facility had a fire of unknown origin that lasted for 16 hours.

Kamaz builds about 40,000 trucks a year, half of which are sent to the military. According to a Russian publication, total truck production in Russia was 25,500 in January-March 2026. If 102,000 trucks were produced this year and all of them were sent to the military and not sold to civilians, the production of trucks would equal the losses if Russia continued to lose 8,600 trucks a month, which was the May average.

The attrition of Russian trucks is another key factor in applying pressure on Russia. Its economy needs at least 20,000 new trucks every year. The army needs an increasing number of trucks. If the attrition and production levels remain frozen, then Russia’s economy will suffer because the trucks that would have been sold to civilians would be directed to the army. If the attrition level of Russian trucks rises, and/or the production level of trucks fell due to attacks on the factories, then the availability of trucks would significantly diminish over the months.

A shortage of trucks is a much bigger problem for the Russian army than a shortage of tanks. Attacking Russian truck production would accelerate the shortage of Russian trucks.

(…to be continued…)

Pokrovsk

Russian and Ukrainian forces have been coinhabiting Rodynske for six months. Russian drones attack Ukrainian positions in Rodynske and Ukraine bombs Russian positions in Rodynske.

A Russian multiple rocket launcher bombards Shevchenko.

A Ukrainian drone team used the same ambush site with three drones to kill three Russians. The third soldier tripped over the body of a previous victim. The grass concealed the drone while the slope of the rise silhouetted passing infantrymen.

On Oleh’s previous rotation at the front he only had to walk 200 meters to his front line positions after a vehicle dropped him off. But in mid-November, the Russian drones were more dangerous and Oleh and his partner were dropped off 6 km from their position in Pokrovsk, expecting to rotate out in a month. A week later, Syrsky ordered rotations to last no longer than two months, but those orders weren’t implemented in the field yet. Some were trapped in unsustainable positions long after it was time to withdraw.

By January the pressure from the Russian drones was worse. Oleh lost the feeling in his legs due to the cold. He and his soldier were trapped in a bunker because the Russian drones were constantly overhead. A Russian drone spotted their position and entered the dugout. It became entangled on the tarpaulin over the entrance and everyone froze. He lay down on the plastic sheeting inside the trench and realized there were bones underneath. The drone didn’t detonate.

Sometimes they were supplied by ground or aerial drones. Several times they’d go 4-5 days without food. The Russian drones would target the Ukrainian drones more than they would any military equipment. Drones would fly out medicine for anyone that was sick or lightly wounded. When a soldier was severely wounded, they’d wait for bad weather and extract him with a ground drone. Only when a soldier had an immediate risk of death would they send a ground drone when the weather was good because of the risk of the ground drone being attacked.

The Russians also use ground drones for supplies, but not once has anyone seen them use a ground drone to evacuate one of their own wounded soldiers.

Starting in March, Oleh was always hungry. It was difficult to supply his position with food. It was risky to withdraw him, particularly when there was no vegetation to provide concealment. He was still hungry in April and in May. Finally, 183 days after walking to his position, Oleh started walking out with the other survivors in a mass withdrawal, no more than three men abreast.

They had to move slowly under the leaves and other greenery that came with spring. His partner that walked with him to the front line was dead and they couldn’t risk evacuating his body. His feet still suffered from the frostbite that occurred back in January. It took him two hours to slowly walk to his front line position back in mid-November. In May, it took him three days to stumble and crawl his way back to the safety of friendly positions.

“Death was chasing me, stalking me,” Oleh recounted in a hospital bed three days after he emerged alive from the kill zone. “Every day I was there and all the way back.”

Zelenyi Hai

Russia bombed Zirka, indicating a Ukrainian presence there. Piddubne is also contested. Few videos or reports have been provided for this sector other than one- and two-man positions are intertwined among the two sides.

Huliaipole

The lines are fairly static. Huliaipilske was occupied by both sides. Infiltration and clearing positions is the standard mode of battle in this sector.

Zaporizhzhia

Ukraine’s front line units play a major part in intercepting Shahed drones. If the Shahed makes it past their interceptor drone teams then mobile teams are directed to the path of the Shahed. In this video, an interceptor drone pursues a Shahed from the rear and catches up with hit.

Unknown Location

An FP-1 launcher was destroyed by a Shahed for the first time.

A TOS-1A almost blew itself up when a rocket malfunctioned.

Debris from a Russian command center littered the road and fires were still burning in the morning after a nighttime attack.

Occupied Territories

In one of very few Ukrainian-run campaigns making serious sense, Russian trains in Crimea are being attacked at ranges up to 230 km west of Kerch. All train traffic in Crimea was stopped for two days.

Five cargo and tanker ships were attacked in the ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, or in the coastal waters. One ship at sea lost two crew members and was abandoned after catching on fire. The other lost three crew members and the bridge was badly damaged.

Ukraine says they have fire control over Donetsk Airport. Mobile Shahed launchers, air defenses, warehouses and logistical equipment are regularly attacked there.

30 km east of Donetsk, the region’s largest power station was on fire.

A compound that housed a Russian engineering regiment was torched. Each subsequent attack showed the damage from previous attacks. Trucks and natural gas storage tanks were also hit.

From March-May, 81 Russian air defense systems were destroyed, making it easier to attack Russian targets. Ukraine’s Code 9.2 displayed the multiple air defense components it destroyed among other targets over the last couple of months.

Truck wrecks and fires. Trucks are attacked on the road and hiding in the trees. Russia is using decoy vehicles and soldiers to try and draw an attack. Ukraine’s 3rd Special Operations Regiment claims aerial control along the Melitopol-Chonhar road, where the terrain offers little concealment.

The Russian army is planning to seize civilian transport vehicles to camouflage shipments and replace losses. Drivers would be forbidden to wear uniforms. Civilian traffic has been banned on the main highways so these civilian vehicles would presumably be using secondary roads.

Ukraine could destroy more trucks if they had more drones so they are dedicating $112 million to build mid-strike drones. Ukraine and Norway are planning to jointly produce several thousand middle strike drones. Germany is spending $600 million to develop Ukrainian deep and middle strike capabilities. Ukraine’s capabilities will progress.

Russian trains in Dzhankoy are attacked by drones. A tanker truck in Crimea was destroyed 225 km from the front lines.

For all the damage they are doing, most Ukrainian drones in Russian airspace are shot down. But in Crimea, the drones of the 422nd drone regiment make it through Russian air defences 70-80% of the time.

Because of the attacks on trucks, there is a shortage of gasoline in Crimea. Tourists can call a number to get fuel at designated gas stations in order to leave. Even so, there is not enough gasoline to meet those demands. There is also a shortage of some food products, such as sugar, rice, buckwheat, salt, flour, cooking oil, and pasta, because of distribution issues and panic buying. Some vacationers were marooned in the Sochi airport for days because drone attacks were closing airports throughout Russia and flights were canceled. Peak holiday season is July and August.

(…to be continued…)

Good morning, and welcome to another week where the European Union and other ‘Ukrainian allies’ continue to excel at one thing: organizing deck chairs on the Titanic while the orchestra plays ‘Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Better’… but slower.

Please, don’t get distracted by our favourite corrupt bureaucrats in Berlin, Paris, London, Rome, Warsaw, and similar places pretending they’re busy drafting another strongly worded letter of protest against Russian attacks on Ukraine, while continuing to wholeheartedly support Israel’s genocide of Palestinians (and then wondering why nobody takes them seriously). Instead, look at the scoreboard from the last 48 hours.

That the Russians remain insistent on the thesis that quantity is a quality all its own is nothing new. 236 drones were launched during the night from Saturday to Sunday. Of course, official Kyiv reacted by performing PR-miracles: 124 shot down. Actually, that’s a kill rate anybody should frown at, but for official Ukraine, that’s a reason to celebrate. Even more so when Zele’s government can provide evidence it’s not just taking hits on the chin, but punching back hard, too. We’ve got confirmation of strikes on the Chonhar bridge using ‘Behemoth’ and ‘Fire Point’ drones. Beautiful names for delivery systems of high-explosive reality checks. But the real kicker? The Sheskharis oil terminal in Novorossiysk. That’s not just a military target; that’s Russia’s wallet on fire…. Moscow was quick to retaliate: 155 drones streamed over Ukraine, the last night…

…in earlier times, cheering videos of the resulting explosions was the kind of content that would get you banned on social media for ‘promoting violence’: nowadays it’s almost as popular as football… And, in military vocabulary, it’s called ‘targeting logistics.’

Meanwhile, in the land of fancy photo ops and press releases, Zele wasted yet more electrons to ‘reveal details’ of his talks with the leaders of the UK, France, and Germany. I’m sure the conversation was riveting. ‘We stand with you,’ they likely said, while checking their watches to ensure they don’t miss the next EU summit on regulating the curvature of bananas. It’s the same tired script: strong words of support delivered with the urgency of a DMV clerk. The irony is palpable: Ukraine is fighting a war for survival with evolving drone warfare and guts, while its backers are stuck in a governance loop of professional paralysis on order by their super-rich masters.

So, as we sip our cappuccinos and complain about inflation, remember: the status quo isn’t peace. It’s just a pause between another market manipulation… and a few explosions… somewhere out there, far away, in the East...

There were additional explosions further south-east, in the Middle East, though. There, a precarious calm had held for nearly two months since the 8 April ‘ceasefire’ that halted joint US-Israeli-Emirati strikes on Iran (and the resulting Iranian retaliation in the form of ballistic missiles and drones upon everyone in the neighbourhood).

Characteristically, the talking heads all over the West are complaining that the ‘silence’ was broken Sunday evening around 22:00 local time; how ‘sirens wailed across northern Israel’, about ‘signals that Tehran is reopening of this front’.

Because, predictably, the narrative must be managed in favour of Israel - and Israel is never the party that caused or started the trouble….?

In reality, Israel constantly violated the ceasefire with Hezbollah - which, oh what a surprise - which, since back in April, was (and remains) one of Tehran’s publicly listed conditions to stop retaliating. Indeed, a week ago Tehran politely, yet explicitly, warned again: no air strikes on Beirut, or we are going to retaliate.

But hey: even the sparrows on my roof know that Israel can’t be held accountable for wars it’s causing, nor for ceasefire violations. Therefore, Israel bombed yet another (presumably the 17,982nd) ‘command centre’ in Beirut; a few hours later, the IRGCASF launched a volley of ballistic missiles at Ramat David AB (the primary Israeli hub for air strikes on Lebanon, but that’s called ‘civilians’ by Israel and Israel-supporters), and ‘thus’, Israel couldn’t help but fly peaceful and democratic air strikes on ‘targets’ in western and central Iran…

Because, you know, it’s official now: Israel cannot accept an Iranian retaliation every time it targets Hezbollah. That’s nothing else but a blasphemy!

What was at least as funny was IQ47’s reaction: the man who has scuppered three agreements with Tehran in the last month alone, always to appease Netanyahu, and who ordered renewed strikes on Iran just four days ago - only to have US bases in Kuwait (including the local international airport, because this is also used by US armed forces) ‘not-hit’ (according to the CENTCOM) by Iranians in retaliation - has called for a ‘return to calm’ and urged negotiations. Because, and that’s well-known for more than 100 years now: the victims in the Middle East are supposed to stop shooting whenever subjected to aggression. Besides, the USA and the rest of ‘the West’, need peace to continue arming the aggressor.

…and so, 100 days into IQ47’s 3-Day Special Military Operation, we’re back into the usual oscillation between escalation and diplomacy of wet dreams and market manipulations.

…but you want me to remain serious and analyse all these grandiose victories in professional fashion?

Ah well… no problem. I’m lucky: can hand over to Don. He’s much better in keeping it serious.

Overview

Ukraine demonstrated its capability to attack a variety of targets over multiple days around St. Petersburg just as Russia began hosting an economic conference. This was not a coincidence. They attacked economic targets, research institutions and military facilities. The local citizens were impressed by the scope of the attack and Putin’s inability to stop it.

Back in Ukraine, Russia has drone superiority in some sectors but across Ukraine, for every Russian drone attack there are 1.3 Ukrainian drone attacks. The heavy toll on Russian personnel continues. But the biggest change in the war over the last six months has been the attacks on Russia’s ability to move equipment, supplies and personnel.

Russian trucks have always been a valued target but access to them was limited by the availability and range of the drones Ukraine had. Trucks that operated within 20 km of the front line were hit, and then Ukrainian drones were regularly hitting trucks within 50 km. A Ukrainian FPV drone recently hit a truck 103 km away, but most trucks operating beyond 50 km were safe until this year. Ukraine is now using $5,000 drones to regularly reach targets 200 km away.

The number of trucks destroyed is not only currently impacting Russian logistics, it has the potential to threaten the number of trucks the Russian military has to operate. In the month of May, Ukraine destroyed the same number of trucks that Russia produced for both military and civilian uses. If this trend increases in Ukraine’s favor, it has the potential to impact the number of trucks the Russian economy needs to function.

Ukraine publishes a daily list of Russian losses. Destroying artillery systems is nice. The destruction of air defence systems is critical. Russian personnel losses are the most important category. But start paying attention to the ‘Vehicles and Fuel Tanks’ category. They lost 103,658 of those vehicles since February 24, 2022 and 358 of them were lost on June 6th alone. It took 1,563 days to achieve those losses. If 358 vehicles are destroyed every day then 103,658 more vehicles will be destroyed in 290 days.

Unless Russia can find a way to counter these drone attacks, Russian truck losses will increase until they start to drop. If Russian truck losses drop without the Ukrainian drone attacks being countered, it will be because there would be fewer trucks to attack. By that time, front line conditions for the Russian military would already have drastically deteriorated for lack of supplies.

Kharkiv

Russia is trying to create their own medium-range-strike drone capabilities. In two locations they are using Molniya-1 drones to attack traffic on the road between Kharkiv and Sumy up to 45 km away. They are also attacking traffic on the road between Pokrovsk and Pavlohrad up to 90 km away.

Russia ordered 1.1 million Molniya drones at $1,500 each. As they start to receive more of these drones, the attacks on Ukraine’s logistics will increase.

Lyman

There were no further reports of Ukraine advancing. The 120th Brigade did eliminate Russians that infiltrated into and around Lyman. A Ukrainian airstrike leveled a building in Yampil.

Besides being an effective unit, the 3rd Corps, centered on the 3rd Brigade, is very good at advertising, which provides it with a source of recruits. The corps lists its accomplishments on its first anniversary.

After stabilizing a sector that lost 70 square km a month, it defended over 150 km on the front and disrupted logistics up to 200 km behind enemy lines. The corps killed 35,000 occupiers, conducted 300k drone strike missions, and shot down 17,000 Russian drones. 50% of the Ukrainian army ground drones are operated by the 3rd Corps. They’ve conducted 18,000 reconnaissance missions, and delivered 4,500 tons of cargo with drones.

The corps conducted 600 medical evacuations with ground drones. None of the wounded suffered further injury while being evacuated despite some being attacked by Russian aerial drones. The corps medical system returns 85% of the wounded back to the front line.

The 3rd, 53rd, 60th, 63rd and 125th brigades are assigned to the 3rd Corps, but the corps also has operational control of separate regiments and battalions and units from the Territorial Defense, State Border Guard Service and the National Guard. They provide them the same level of support as they do to their organic units and are responsible for training the 66th Brigade, the 120th Territorial Brigade and 3rd Border Guard Detachment.

Sloviansk

Russians clear a house in Rai-Oleksandrivka. They are trying to cut off the Ukrainian-held land to the east of that village and Nykyforivka.

Kostiantynivka

Russian drone attacks in Druzhkivka are increasing, multiple drones are shot down on the main road every day and Russia has been mining the road for a month. There are a lot of Russian bodies between Berestok and east of Illinivka and the Russians keep passing through. The high-rise buildings in southwest Kostiantynivka are a staging ground. The Russians that reach it are resupplied by foot and drone before moving north. Ukrainian airstrikes bombed some of these staging buildings.

As they have with other cities, Russia is using an incendiary rocket to burn Kostiantynivka. It is often described as white phosphorus but it is actually 180 hexagonal prisms of magnesium alloy that burns for two minutes.

Ukraine bombs the buildings near the substation. Ukraine’s Omega assault team clears the hospital and drops a bomb in the basement before being picked up by a protected vehicle.

Russia attacks UGVs in and around Kostiantynivka and destroys a M109 155 mm gun.

(…to be continued…)

If the downlink to the ground station is blocked, Starlink can relay the signal to another satellite by using the Optical Inter-Satellite Links (ISL) that became operational this year. There are 4,600 Generation 1 satellites that don’t have this capability, but the 7,400 Generation 2 satellites can use lasers to transmit data to other ISL-capable satellites which can then send the signal to an unblocked ground station.

The Russians jammed the GPS signals in Ukraine so software updates were created to allow terminal operators to enter in their location data manually. The terminal then ignores the spoofed GPS date it received and can aim the antenna towards the satellites. In addition, the location of the Starlink satellites are precisely known, so their signals can be used as an alternative to GPS signals.

Starlink also uses frequency hopping by jumping rapidly from one frequency to another in the 12.2-12.7 GHz range. All the satellites and terminals change the frequencies at the same time, the pattern of which is encrypted and pseudo-random. The jammer must then jam all the channels in that range, which takes an enormous amount of power, or it must be able to somehow follow the hops in frequencies.

Ukrainian drones use Starlink terminals to stay in communication as they hunt Russian targets as far as 200 km behind the front lines. That’s an area too big to jam and Russian logistics and command centers are paying the price.

The Question of Syrsky

The 225th and 425th Assault regiments have been accused of being meat regiments, used in attacks much as Russians throw troops into attacks without regard for their soldier’s lives. Because of the growing criticism, a former journalist was transferred from his job in a drone unit to be the spokesperson for the 425th regiment.

You can read what he says here for context. In broad terms, he says the reason they have 10,000 soldiers in the 425th instead of the 1,500-2,000 soldiers of other regiments is because they’re an effective unit and that was the decision of superiors. The reason why they conducted multiple mechanized assaults at Pokrovsk and Kupiansk and lost a lot of vehicles and troops is because they were ordered to conduct these attacks by superiors. The reason they have the highest number of complaints at the office of the ombudsman is because they are the largest unit. He says it’s an honor for different parts of the unit to be sent to the aid of others but it makes the logistics difficult because, among other things, they all receive their drones from the same warehouse, no matter where the units are on the battlefield. The 425th isn’t responsible for any of their losses, they were only following orders, and anyone that disagrees with how the 425th fights the war doesn’t know what they’re talking about. In his opinion, the unit should be praised as a role model.

In truth, the 425th does fight hard in difficult situations. I do not question the fighting spirit of the soldiers. I question the objectives they are assigned and the manner in which they try to achieve those objectives.

There is enough history to show that in a drone dominated battlefield, moving is more dangerous than a firefight with small arms. Russians are more likely to die crossing an open field, moving on a road, or moving along a treeline than engaging Ukrainians in an urban environment. Fighting from house to house is more favorable to the Russians than trying to advance across fields. It does not mean that Ukraine should immediately withdraw from a city once the Russians gain a foothold. It does mean that they need to be very careful and deliberate when engaging in an urban fight because of the increased danger.

There needs to be proper support to prevent infiltration and being cut off. Paths for supplies, medical evacuations and withdrawals need to be maintained. Urban combat is a much more manpower intensive fight than fighting over treelines, and in a drone-dominated environment the goal is to disperse manpower, not condense it. And, yes, when there are no longer any advantages to defending a piece of terrain, whether it is urban or rural, then the defender should withdraw from that terrain. Especially when the disadvantages are clear.

It makes no sense to throw troops into an urban battle, whether with mechanized assaults or helicopter assaults, when any terrain gained will be temporary and the cost in men and equipment is high. That describes the battle of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Small Ukrainian forces were repeatedly cut off. Wounded soldiers that might otherwise be evacuated were killed or captured. Dramatic assaults were filmed as a heroic event when they did not change the outcome and came with a higher cost in men and equipment. And the Russians troops kept moving into the two cities.

Ukraine didn’t create the conditions for victory but they kept fighting the battle anyway. It was no different than Bakhmut. The higher casualties they suffered delayed the inevitable but the extra time they held on to that terrain undermined the ultimate goal of removing Russian forces from Ukraine.

Kupiansk was different. It was still an urban fight but Ukraine created the conditions that made victory possible. With drone and ground forces, they cut the flow of Russian troops entering the city. It was now the Russians inside the city that were cut off, isolated, with no path for supplies, reinforcement or retreat. It was still a dangerous fight that required patience, planning and caution. We’ve seen Columbian troops, once detected by Russian drones, being forced to seek shelter and wait. Their headquarters kept them informed and finally let them know that the skies were clear of enemy drones. And then they resumed clearing out the isolated Russians, carefully, methodically.

That is not what the detachment of the 425th did during one attack at Kupiansk. They were given an objective to clear and decided to take two vehicles and drive to the objective instead of walking there, as advised.

The most dangerous time for Russians when attacking is advancing towards the objective, either through an open field, a road or a treeline. That is true for Ukrainians, as well. The vehicles were destroyed, as many Russian vehicles have been destroyed by drones, and there were casualties among the dismounted troops. The proper decision would have been to try and avoid detection, because once drones detect you, they can persistently attack. Walking under the concealment of trees would have reduced their chances of being detected.

There are a lot of engagements by the 425th that are effective and support achievable objectives. The operations that are poorly conceived and highly visible are the responsibility of their commanders. And their commanders answer to Syrsky.

There used to be other brigades that were sent to stop Russian advances in emergency conditions, but they started questioning Syrsky’s objectives and methods. One commander was relieved right before his unit was sent into Kursk because there was insufficient planning and no achievable objective. Once inside Russia, the commanders of the senior units had to coordinate amongst themselves and their adjacent units because there was no higher guidance and direction. It was just a bunch of units moving in a general direction, and they sustained heavier casualties the further they went.

Supported defensive positions were never established. There were no reserve forces sent to stop Russian breakthroughs. There were Ukrainian counterattacks using mechanized assaults in the open that achieved nothing at the cost of heavy casualties. And as Ukraine was pushed into a narrow, confined perimeter, there was little consideration for withdrawal, despite the heavy toll of vehicles trying to supply and sustain the troops while using only two roads that were easily covered by drones.

It’s a familiar pattern that has long been associated with General Syrsky. He was known to micromanage defenses down the platoon level while failing to sustain the troops that are defending with replacements and reserves ready to counterattack any threatened breakthrough. When breakthroughs do happen, the response from senior leadership is often delayed, because there are no local reserves. And then, as the situation worsens, battalions are detached from dozens of brigades across Ukraine and thrown into the hole. These battalions are far from the logistical support of their own brigades, and there was poor communication and coordination between these suddenly orphaned battalions fighting next to each other. So they did little to stop the Russian advances and lost a lot of troops as they were pushed back. Faced with continuous poor leadership, some soldiers ran away, adding to Ukraine’s manpower issues.

If all those battalions were available as emergency forces once a breakthrough happened, then surely forces could have been available to stop a breakthrough before it happened.

There are multiple cities and pockets that were held onto much too long: Avdiivka, Nevelske pocket, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, Uspenivka pocket, Velyka Novosilka, Kursk, Mynohrad, Pokrovsk.

There were multiple times when there was a breakthrough and there was little to no reaction at the strategic level: Ocheretyne, Niu-York/Toretsk, Vodiane, Pishchane, Tarasivka, Komar, Verbove.

There were multiple times when defenses were neglected so long that they broke: Vuhledar, Terny, Siversk.

One of the best things Ukraine could have done was the establishment of the Corps in early 2025. Not only did this make sense from an organizational point of view, it put more resources in the hands of capable commanders that could now influence a greater portion of the battlefield. With their additional power and proven success, Ukraine could fight rationally, effectively, on larger sections of the battlefield. Syrsky was still the commander, but he no longer had the capability to micromanage the units in the effective corps. The corps commanders could still work towards their assigned objectives, but they could insulate their troops from orders that made no sense, and could even ignore Syrsky on occasion.

Last August, the Russians broke through north of Pokrovsk and advanced in force up to eight kilometers to Kucheriv Yar. This was not a new scenario. Defenses were weakened without any apparent awareness by the higher command, and there were no local reserves to react to any breakthrough. It seemed like another unraveling of a sector that would set the stage for a major Russian advance. But something new happened: The 1st Corps commander was tasked with organizing a response.

He moved quickly, which was also new. Since there was no local reserve, he detached battalions from brigades like Syrsky did in the past. The difference is, he only drew from brigades in the Pokrovsk and Kostiantynikva area, not from multiple units across Ukraine. This reduced the strain on logistics and other sustainment efforts. He assigned specific sectors to each unit and the activities between adjacent units were coordinated. When the threat was contained and the flow of Russian troops into the area was heavily interdicted, the penetration was no longer a threat. It was gradually reduced over four months with low casualties among Ukrainians and high casualties for the Russians.

The Russians in Kupiansk were similarly eliminated under the leadership of the 2nd Corps, which also minimized Ukrainian losses through patience and the methodic execution of detailed planning.

With the rise of the Corps in early 2025, Syrsky lost a lot of influence on front line operations, which was a good thing. He sought to change that with the formation of the Assault Forces in August of 2025. Assault forces as a strategic reserve is a fine concept but Syrsky made sure the commander of the Assault Forces and the assault regiments answered to him without question. By this time, replacements were supposed to be evenly distributed to all the brigades in the army, countering another Syrsky policy of directing them to favored units. Somehow, though, the 425th still grew to 10,000 personnel and the assault forces still had priority on equipment.

And they often fight in the manner of Syrsky.

Syrsky fights like a Soviet commander, using mass, speed and aggression to gain territorial objectives, without regard to the value of those objectives. But Ukraine is inferior to Russia in terms of mass. “A small Soviet army cannot defeat a large Soviet army.” During the Cold War, NATO was inferior to the Warsaw Pact in terms of mass, so NATO multiplied their combat power with better, more expensive equipment, better training, better command and control and increased situational awareness. Ukraine multiplies its combat power through innovation and mass production of inexpensive weapons, communications and situational awareness, and operational agility.

The formation of the Corps has reduced Syrsky’s influence on the details of front line combat. The creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces not only multiplied Ukraine’s power with the dominant branch on the battlefield, it created a sphere of influence free of Syrsky. Common sense rules have been created, such as the distribution of replacements based on need, not a commander’s preference, in order to limit Syrsky’s practices. Just last week Fedorov announced he is removing the general staff from the process of equipping the troops. Fedorov also said that purchases of artillery and mortars should be halted and the money should be used to buy other weapons, such as drones. And the 7th Corps reported its 147th Artillery Brigade has a HIMARS system and has used it already. Stefan Korshak points out that these weapons systems were held at the army level where Syrsky had control of the target list. At the Corps level, front line decisions could be made faster, and faster decisions destroy enemy assets. It is one less thing for Syrsky to micromanage.

The 20th Corps near Huliaipole is not one of the strong corps. That sector has had a problem for 20 months, long before corps were created. There is a strong Ukrainian drone presence in the region that helps reduce Ukrainian casualties and a lot of the assault forces are committed to that region. And it’s had a positive effect. The Russian advances there have been greatly reduced and Ukraine has seen their own advances. In the opening days of the Ukrainian counterattack, a number of Ukrainian vehicles were destroyed as they rode into combat. There’s no indication that there were high losses of Ukrainian infantry, though, and operations are now being conducted on foot. Under these conditions, with that level of support, this is a good use of the assault regiments.

The disorganized and sometimes disastrous combat operations by unsupported units or poorly led units in the past led to a huge level of mistrust within the Ukrainian army and the result was widespread desertions. The Ukrainian front is stabilized now, and Ukraine has the initiative in some sectors. There is still a shortage of soldiers working with ground drones and other occupations. Hopefully, some of those that left can be convinced to help stable, effective units. Their return would increase Ukraine’s capabilities.

Not every detail of Ukrainian military operations is known, but so much has been done to reduce Syrsky’s influence that it does make me wonder which of his continuing contributions makes him so valuable.

Sweden will donate up to 16 Gripen aircraft in 2027 and Ukraine will buy 100-150 aircraft over several years. Ukraine plans to produce Gripen aircraft in Ukraine in 2033.

The Chinese company Harxon is supplying Russia with 7-, 8-, and 16-channel CRPA satellite navigation antennas which protect against Ukrainian electronic warfare systems. The company tries to disguise the sales but an invoice for 200 antennas for $800,000 was discovered. The company also supplies a 32-channel antenna, which is effective against many EW systems but Ukraine says the Lima Quant system can defeat it.

Lima and the Kometa Antenna

Cascade is an electronic warfare company that has offices in the US and Ukraine. Some of the developers are members of Ukraine’s electronic warfare units. They started developing a system in 2022 to fight Russian cruise missiles. Ukraine’s military was skeptical at first, but after the company invested $2 million of their own money to develop the system, and it proved its effectiveness on the battlefield, the government was finally convinced. Ukraine started using the Lima systems to protect the military in July 2024, and in October 2025 they began protecting civilian infrastructure.

Lima worked by jamming the GPS signals of missiles and bombs. Without a GPS signal making corrections, the weapon can deviate from its course by two kilometers every 100 km it travels. If the target is in the city, though, any deviation from that target can still destroy other nearby structures.

This is why Lima also spoofed incoming weapons by overriding the GPS signal and substituting its own coordinates. In an early use of the EW system, an incoming weapon thought it was in Peru, whose capital is Lima. Using false coordinates, Lima can convince the weapon system to attack empty fields.

The effectiveness of glide bombs (KABs) was also reduced. Even if the jamming of the glide bombs didn’t start until 10 km before impact, that would still create a deviation zone of 200 meters. If the bomb detonates 20 meters from a bunker, the bunker will survive.

This is electronic warfare, though, and for every counter, there is a counter to the counter. Russia developed the Kometa-4 system that used four radio receiver elements. Because of Lima, they upgraded it to eight receivers in April 2024, providing it with more data to determine if a signal is legitimate or fake by using the strength and angle of the incoming signal. If the fake signal is too weak then the true navigation signal will provide the legitimate data. If the fake signal is too strong, it will be filtered out. If a signal is coming from the ground, then it cannot be a navigation satellite signal and is filtered out.

A phased array antenna, like the Kometa, can filter out one less jamming signal than the number of elements it has. The Kometa-4 phased array antenna had four elements, which meant it could filter out three jamming signals at a time. Ukraine had to use four Limas to brute force jam it, so Russia upgraded to the Kometa-8 system, which would require 8 EW systems to jam it. Ukraine captured an intact eight-receiver Kometa system and figured out how to defeat it, so Russia upgraded it to 12 receivers by March 2025. By June 2025, Russia was using the Kometa-16 on selected weapons.

The Kometa-12’s and -16’s weren’t just additional elements added to the antenna, though, they were part of a redesigned system that required much more than 12 and 16 jammers to overcome them. With this new system, it would take 19 jammers to defeat a Kometa-8 system and the higher level systems would withstand 100 jammers. On top of that, when a KAB was jammed, it could resist until it was only a few hundred meters from their targets, leaving little time for a wide deviation.

In 2024, Russia dropped between 3,200 and 3,500 bombs a month. In 2025 that rose and Russia dropped 1,370 bombs during one week in October. The missiles and drones attacking Kyiv’s cities at least had a chance to be intercepted, but the bombs were a serious threat to Ukraine’s military.

When the new Kometa system appeared in March 2025, Cascade worked with Night Watch, a Territorial Defense electronic warfare unit, to upgrade the Lima. Three months later, they developed the Lima Quant. It used higher frequency signals and was able to prevent the Russian antenna from determining the direction its signal came from, ground or sky, which removed one layer of defense. It is also able to conduct a cyberattack on Russian navigation systems. When the antenna downloads the data from the satellite, Lima Quant makes it pull the incorrect data and can’t update with the correct data until long after it is no longer being suppressed by Lima.

The effect on the Russian KABs was immediate. The bombs had zero accuracy and could only rely on random chance to hit a target. To counter the jamming, Russia started dropping 8, 12 and 16 bombs on the same target in the hopes that one of them would hit the target.

A Ukrainian defense industry spokesman said, “The KABs either did not hit or they could not even be released, because the guidance system produced a navigation error. Russian pilots did not understand what was happening, because navigation on these CRPAs (antennas) was lost 100 km before the line of combat.”

The spokesman continued, “The effectiveness of KABs dropped to zero. On a roughly 700 km stretch of the front, the enemy dropped 869 KABs in one of the previous months. The consequences of these strikes were minor injuries to eight servicemen.”

It wasn’t just bombs that were affected. Cascade says that their system defeated 20,500 Shahed drones and dozens of ballistic and cruise missiles in the last 18 months. The high speed of the Kinzhal missiles were difficult to intercept for non-Patriot systems, and Patriot missiles were in short supply. Yet since last summer, 32 Lima devices were able to jam 58 out of 59 Kinzhal missiles that were launched. Any noise in sufficient volume would be able to jam a receiver, but Ukraine decided to use the song, “Our Father is Bandera, Ukraine is our Mother”. The accuracy of Iskander missiles has also decreased because of Lima.

The Kometa and other CRPA’s can be suppressed at 50 km, KABs can be suppressed at more than 100 km, and cruise and ballistic missiles can be defeated at ranges of 300 km.

The Kometa antennas were still a threat to areas not covered by Lima Quant. They are made at the VNIIR-Progress workshop in Cheboksary so Ukraine attacked that facility with drones in June 2025, July 2025, November 2025 and February 2026. In May 2026 the facility was attacked with two drones and a Flamingo missile. It is not known how much these attacks slowed production or research but they did not eliminate production.

Cascade provided more than 400 Limas to Ukraine at a cost of $67,000 each. It takes 30 to 100 units to protect a major city, which would cost $2-6.8 million. A single Patriot PAC-3 MSE missile currently costs $5.3 million (The US just started a program to develop a missile that will cost under $1 million). In order to protect all of Ukraine from drones and cruise missiles it would cost $1 billion (14,782 Lima systems). In order to protect all of Ukraine from ballistic missiles it would cost an additional $800 million (11,826 more Lima systems). With only 400 systems, they can’t cover the entire country, and there was recent evidence that Lima systems weren’t active on the front lines in the Huliaipole region.

This is the realm of electronic warfare. It is likely that Russia is already working on ways to defeat Lima Quant. It is also likely that Ukraine is already thinking of ways to improve the system. Ukraine constantly changes Lima based on the characteristics of Russian weapons, and they often change where it is placed and how it is used. It is only a question of time before things change again.

Starlink Communications

Traditional communication satellites are in geostationary orbits 35,786 km above the earth and rotate with the earth in the same relative position. Because of the distance, it takes half a second or more for the signal to travel from earth to the satellite and back.

Starlink has 9,000 satellites between 340 and 550 km above the earth. They are not stationary relative to the earth and take 90 minutes to complete an orbit at 27,000 kph. Communication with one satellite only lasts a few minutes before it’s handed off to the next satellite.

A Starlink terminal tracks the satellite without moving parts because its phased array antenna can manipulate the direction of the signal electronically by delaying sending the signal to its 1,152-1,280 elements by fractions of a nanosecond. This creates an interference pattern of waves and troughs. The primary wave lines up in one direction and creates the signal. The troughs line up in all other directions and cancel the signal. Small waves with low power also form and are called side lobes. By focusing its sending and receiving signals on the satellites, it is difficult to receive signals from other directions, including jamming signals. Jamming signals would have to be loud enough, through power or proximity, to overcome the spatial filtering of a directional antenna.

There are three ways to deny Starlink communications. The first is to jam the GPS signal for the terminal. The terminal must know exactly where it is, even while moving, so it can aim its antenna to a Starlink satellite. If it cannot receive a GPS signal, or if the GPS signal is spoofed with a false signal to provide a false location, it will point its antenna in the wrong direction and be unable to communicate with the satellite.

Latvia reports that Russia has expanded its ability to spoof up to 450 km in the Kaliningrad region. The number of antennas Kaliningrad had to spoof GPS increased from three in 2025 to 36 now.

The second way to block a signal is to broadcast a signal loud enough that it will overpower the uplink signal to the satellite with noise. If the satellite does not receive a signal from a terminal, it cannot pass it on.

When the Starlink satellite does receive a signal, it is sent to a ground station that is connected to the fiber backbone. If the downlink signal is jammed then the ground station never passes the signal to the intended user.

In January, Iran was able to create various jamming signals that were loud enough to block 30-80% of the data packets being sent and received from Starlink terminals in its country. It did so with imported Russian electronic warfare equipment and domestic clones of that equipment. Some equipment blocks Starlink terminals on the ground to a certain distance. Other equipment blocks the signal from a Starlink satellite, which would block communication with any terminal trying to connect with that satellite within a 1,000 km diameter.

Starlink has methods to counter jamming.

As stated, Starlink can use its phased array antenna to create a strong wave in a desired direction and, as a byproduct, side lobes are created that filter out all but the most powerful signals. If a jamming signal is detected, it can adjust the antenna to create a null in the direction of that jamming signal. While it is difficult to pass a signal strong enough through a side or back lobe, it is impossible to pass a signal through a null.

There are mathematical limits to the number of nulls a phased array can create in different directions to block different jammers, and that is the number of elements it has minus one. If the terminal has 1,152 elements it can create 1,151 nulls. If the jammer is moving, or if there are dozens of jammers, or if the terminal is moving, then this capability to block them with nulls can struggle to place the nulls in the ever-changing directions.

(…to be concluded in the Part 5B: Equipment…)

Ukraine

A Kh-101 was intercepted by an air defense missile over Kyiv.

Another view of the Oreshnik missile at Bila Tserkva two weeks ago. A view from inside an apartment. A second missile was used north of Donetsk. You can count the six warheads. They appear as lines because each warhead has six submunitions. Without explosives, they’re similar to 36 scattered, unaimed shotgun pellets. This crater left by one of the submunitions in Bila Tserkva is about the size of a 155 mm shell. The estimated cost of each missile ranges from $40-100 million, so that crater cost $1.1-2.7 million to make. Back in January, they had 3-4 of these missiles. Russia hopes to build six of these missiles in 2026. A Flamingo attack on Votkinsk last February might impact production since Iskander and Oreshnik components were built there.

A shopping mall in Odesa was hit.

A snapshot of one 24 hour period in Ukraine counted 764 strikes in 44 settlements. That included 22 airstrikes, 521 drone attacks and 219 shellings by artillery. Because of days like these, the Russians kill 70-100 Ukrainian civilians each week. Building codes have been changed to require shelters for residences and infrastructure facilities.

A priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) walked around Odesa in his cassock and marked the geolocations of potential targets on Google Maps. In March 2024, an Iskander missile landed on the coordinates he provided based on a suspicion that military personnel might be located there. Emergency services arrived and a second missile landed at the same location. He also provided the location and level of protection for an electrical substation and then gave a damage assessment after it was hit. The location of air defense assets was also sent to Russia.

815 Ukrainian civilians were killed and 4,174 were wounded in the first four months of 2026, a rate that is 21% higher than in 2025. Tens of millions went without heating or electricity during the winter. These attacks cost billions of dollars and they do not advance Russia’s war effort. Russia is diverting efforts to win the war in order to cause misery.

A Dutch and a US group estimate there are between 5-600,000 Ukrainian military casualties of which 140,000 might be killed as of the end of 2025.

The commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Corps, Andriy Biletsky, says that the Russian army is incapable of making a major breakthrough and that the next six months to nine months will be a critical point for Ukraine to seize the initiative and advance with careful attacks, which would strengthen Ukraine’s position in peace talks. He says Russia has the advantage with fiber optic drones and lost communications capability when Starlink was denied to their military. Ukraine has the advantage with ground drones and heavy bomber drones. The 3rd Corps expects to replace 30% of its infantrymen with ground drones by 2027.

Diplomacy

A Russian drone hit an apartment building in Romania. Two were injured. Once again, NATO promises to defend every inch of allied territory, next time. Several Russian drones have landed in Romania before but this is the first time there has been serious damage and injuries. Russian drones have crossed into Poland before, as well. Despite years of Ukrainian experience with much higher numbers of drones, most NATO states are far behind Ukrainian capabilities.

Some NATO nations are closer to achieving Ukraine’s current capabilities.

There have been 24 drone incidents in the Baltic countries since 2025 due to Russian jamming and spoofing of Ukrainian drones flying by. Latvia has the most realistic drone testing range in NATO and can provide a rough approximation of battle conditions in Ukraine. Learning from Ukraine, Latvia already has optical and audio sensors on the border to detect drones and they will place tactical radars 10-20 km apart. Next month, they will place four-person mobile drone interception teams on the border, but this is just an interim solution. Since Latvia is short of manpower and it would take a lot of teams to cover the border, Latvia will eventually deploy fully automatic interceptor drones in canisters that can be remotely launched by a command center. In several weeks, they’ll start testing automated .50 caliber turrets. They are also developing electronic warfare and inexpensive missile systems.

There has been a lot of military activity in Belarus. If Belarus attacked Ukraine it would consume Ukrainian resources but they would be able to stop the invasion. Robert Brovdi told Belarus that 500 targets have already been chosen in case of an attack. Ukrainian drones would weaken the Belarus security structure and weaken the regime’s hold on the population.

Putin convinced Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Alarmed about Greenland, Trump may have convinced Iceland to join the EU. It didn’t help that the US ambassador to Iceland joked that it could become the 52nd US state. They are hesitant, though, having seen Ireland’s quota for fishing being reduced because that is responsible for 10% of Iceland’s GDP. But the euro is more stable than the krona, and inflation in the EU is half that of Iceland, and the EU might be flexible on fishing quotas.

Russia is warning embassy staff to leave Kyiv. The EU ambassador to Ukraine said Western diplomats won’t leave. Poland said that if its embassy is hit it will be regarded as deliberate and intentional. None of the embassies have left. In fact, the government-in-exile of Belarus opened up a new embassy in Kyiv. They will coordinate action between Ukraine and Belarusian democratic forces and support Belarusians living in Ukraine.

Lithuania has a 15,000 soldier army. Germany is forming a 4,800-man brigade there by 2027 and Germans in uniform are being thanked, receive discounts when buying coffee and are greeted with smiles. In Germany, many don’t like traveling to work in uniform because of the reception they receive. When Lithuania joined NATO in 2004, President Bush told them that any of their enemies would be the enemy of the US. A Lithuanian said, “At this moment, the United States does not feel like a guarantee.”

Excuses are never needed to exercise power but are often deployed to minimize criticism when power is used. About 5,000 Cubans fought for Russia in Ukraine and Russia paid the Cuban government $25,000 for each soldier. These soldiers informed their government about the effectiveness of drones. Cuba recently acquired 300 military drones and is seeking more. Russia and China have signals intelligence stations in Cuba. The US indicted Raul Castro, the brother of Fidel, for ordering the shootdown of two civilian planes in 1994. The indictment of Venezuela’s leader Maduro was a stated reason for the military operation there. Senator Lindsey Graham, whose support for Ukraine is only surpassed by his obsequious support for Trump, said, “I believe the liberation of the wonderful people of Cuba from the clutches of communism is close at hand.”

Dell computers head pledged $6.25 billion for a Trump accounts program in December. Trump bought over $1 million in Dell stock in February and spent a lot of time praising Dell nine days later. The Pentagon just awarded a contract to Dell for $9.69 billion.

Donald Trump Jr. invested $65 million in Vulcan Elements, a small startup that makes rare earth magnets. Three months later, the White House made calls to the Pentagon to rush a loan to the company. When the Pentagon announced the $620 million loan in exchange for a $50 million stake in the company, the company’s stock value increased from $200 million to $2 billion.

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(…to be concluded with Part 5, tomorrow in the morning…)